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ABSTRACT 
Throughout the last decade, the Department of Defense (DOD) has 
experienced dozens of malicious insider attacks, causing significant damage to U.S. 
national security and the needless loss of life from mass shootings. Senior officials with 
the White House, the DOD, and other federal agencies have directed the 
development of new human-capital acquisitions processes to mitigate selecting 
federal civilians and military personnel who are susceptible to committing misconduct 
or insider attacks. The statistical relevance surrounding the DOD personnel problems 
associated with misconduct and significant insider attacks reinforces the need for 
reformed methodologies specifically directed toward the human-capital acquisitions 
process. This capstone report first demonstrates the scientific evidence and 
behavioral similarities associated with individuals who engage in misconduct and 
historical malicious insider attacks within the DOD. The intent is to then justify 
the implementation of innovative screening methodologies within the acquisition 
process to disqualify applicants with severe indicators of vulnerable predisposition 
precursors exhibited by individuals who commit misconduct and insider attacks. 
The report’s recommended Enhanced Assessment Program focuses efforts on 
preliminarily screening tentative candidates for mental health disorders and personality 
traits as an initial point to identify the threat-vulnerable predisposition precursors 
for further evaluation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. CAPSTONE REPORT GENESIS
The Department of Defense (DOD) Personnel and Security Research Center
(PERSEREC) established “The Threat Lab” department in 2018 due to the increased 
activities by federal civilian employees and military personnel that cause significant 
damage to the United States national security. The Threat Lab is tasked with conducting 
research and analysis in order to identify the underlying social or behavioral characteristics 
that are associated with an individual that conducts harmful action against their employer, 
fellow employees, or the organization. The mission is to then provide educational 
resources, solutions, and recommendations, based on the identified criteria, to prevent or 
actively counter the wide-array of threats posed by inside actors within the DOD. 
Threat Lab Director Stephanie Jaros discussed collaborative research opportunities 
with Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) students in order to support capstone projects that 
will ultimately enhance the DOD’s ability to combat insider threats. This is an important 
task due to the DOD being the first line of defense to incorporate strategic national security 
for every United States citizen. Insider threat activity, misconduct, and other adverse action 
must be prioritized to ensure the DOD is operating at an optimized level and to mitigate 
any damage to national security.  
The largest concern observed by government and DOD officials are the most 
egregious events conducted by inside employees that resulted in direct loss of life and the 
release of classified materials. The DOD responded to the recent insider attacks by 
implementing policies focused on efforts towards insider threat awareness education to 
support the identification of tentative insider threat throughout the workforce. The DOD 
and other federal organizations incorporate mandatory training applications and 
certification programs in the attempt to counter the internal threats through awareness 
towards typical indicators to support internal identification of those threats. For example, 
the DOD established the Certified Counter-Insider Threat Professional Program for 
2 
qualified candidates as well as required all federal employees and service members to 
conduct various annual certification programs with embedded procedures to identify and 
report insider threat activities.1  These programs enable supervisors and employees to 
understand the importance of eliminating the threats while being able to assess the 
characteristics of an individual employee reaching a threshold that leads to a catastrophic 
event. 
The insider threat awareness education approaches to thwart catastrophic insider-
threats before a serious incident occurs are absolutely necessary. Unfortunately, this 
approach relies on an individual threat to openly articulate or demonstrate indicators for a 
vigilant group of employees to identify, report, and ultimately intervene against that threat. 
It is not difficult to conceive that there are opportunities for unintentional failure within 
this approach. Therefore, additional actions must be implemented to ensure an appropriate 
end result can be achieved. 
Countering insider threat activities is undoubtedly a complex problem that requires 
a wide-array of solutions to mitigate future events. Experts that focus efforts towards 
countering “wicked problems,” which are those considered to be the most complex and ill-
structured problems, assert that there is not a definitive solution or set of solutions to 
ultimately eliminate those problems completely. Essentially, derived policies and 
methodologies will only mitigate the problem to a defendable level. The most important 
arguments from wicked problem experts are that significant analysis to frame the problem 
is required and established policies must incorporate review processes to adjust the aspects 
of the policy over time.2  Furthermore, complex problem sets require scientific analysis to 
drive evidence-based approaches that derive policies that attack the underlying motivations 
within the problem.3 
1 “DOD Security Awareness Hub Annual Training Requirements,” Defense Counterintelligence and 
Security Agency, 2020, https://securityawareness.usalearning.gov. 
2 Brian W. Head, “Forty Years of Wicked Problems Literature: Forging Closer Links to Policy 
Studies,” Policy and Society 38, no. 2 (April 3, 2019): 180–97. 
3 Sandra Nutley, Isabel Walter, and Huw Davies, “Using Evidence: How Research Can Inform Public 
Services,” Bristol University Press, 2007. 
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Overall, these assessed issues stem from the consistent occurrence of adverse 
actions ranging from simple misconduct to catastrophic insider threat activities causing 
damage to the United States’ national security. Simple misconduct within the DOD should 
not be easily discounted as it fosters toxic environments and reduces overall effectiveness; 
however, the catastrophic threats are what gain the most attention that demand active 
responses. Therefore, there is a direct need to implement enhanced acquisition processes 
to hire federal civilian employees and select military personnel that are less susceptible to 
engaging in misconduct or commit insider attacks within the DOD. 
The collaborative capstone project between the Threat Lab and NPS supports the 
initial analysis concerning innovative human capital management approaches utilizing 
science-based methodologies to develop enhanced workforce acquisition policies towards 
a “whole-person” assessment concept instituted by the U.S. Army Special Forces Selection 
and Assessment (SFAS) course. Ultimately, the utilization of self-report diagnostic 
assessment tools to identify mental health disorders and personality traits characterized as 
predisposition threat indicators associated with historical insider attacks and severe 
misconduct is necessary to initially screen tentative personnel. These diagnostic 
assessments provide the initial indication of the predisposition threats to initiate further 
evaluation with a behavioral health expert to confirm the existence of disqualifying 
conditions within the acquisition phase. This report details the rationale and justification 
for implementing a “whole-person” assessment methodology in order to mitigate future 
threats and misconduct by selecting personnel with susceptible predispositions to 
committing such actions. 
The following sections within this chapter will analyze and frame the problem as 
well as the associated inputs using behavior and social sciences to prioritize the 
development of recommended DOD policies to mitigate insider-threat activity and 
personnel misconduct. Insider threats are inherently focused on human-risk factors. 
Throughout the last decade, senior officials within the White House, the DOD, and other 
federal agencies have assessed underlying problematic issues within the federal civilian 
employees as well as armed forces service members. 
4 
B. CAPSTONE REPORT IMPORTANCE 
1. DOD Insider Threats 
The most recent, notable DOD “insider-threat” attacks include the actions 
conducted by Major Nidal Hasan, Private First Class (PFC) Bradley Manning, and Edward 
Snowden. Within the DOD organizational structure, Major Hasan and PFC Manning were 
both active-duty military personnel while Edward Snowden was hired as a National 
Security Agency federal civilian employee. The three isolated attacks, by internal 
perpetrators, either caused significant harm to the United States’ national security, resulted 
in significant casualties, or both. It is critical to analyze the associated traits of these 
individuals to highlight the unfortunate consequences of their actions as well as identify 
threat precursors to support the development of innovative acquisition solutions. 
Additionally, it is important to address the vast amount of misconduct, violence, criminal 
actions, and other adverse action that occurs throughout the DOD as a starting point to 
reduce the probability of a catastrophic insider-threat event. 
The deadly action taken by Major Nidal Hasan is characterized as a kinetic insider 
attack due to the principle objective of the attack being to kill or injure others. Hasan was 
commissioned as an Army Psychiatrist in 2003 and served in the Psychiatric Program at 
Walter Reed Army Medical Center before being reassigned to Fort Hood, Texas. While 
stationed at Fort Hood, Hasan conducted one of the highest causalities, mass-shooting 
events by an American on a military base killing 12 Soldiers set to deploy to Afghanistan 
and one civilian in 2009.4  Congressional investigations note that Hasan had been in contact 
with a known terrorist and Yemeni-American Muslim cleric named Anwar al-Awlaki.5  
Multiple communications between the two further radicalized Hasan to conduct the 
homicidal attack. Although military supervisors were unaware of this development at the 
 
4 Catina M Smith, Stephanie L Jaros, and Callie J Chandler, Foreground Factors of DoD Workplace 
Homicide: A Comparative Case Analysis of Incidents Between 2009-2015, TR-17-01 (Seaside, CA: 
Defense Personnel and Security Research Center, 2016), 6. 
5 U.S. Government Publishing Office, Lessons from Fort Hood: Improving Our Ability to Connect the 
Dots, 81-127 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2013), 2. 
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time, Major Hasan had previously and overtly demonstrated the classic behavioral 
indicators typical to similar kinetic insider threat. 
After critical analysis, experts determined that there were several indicators 
spanning multiple years of Hasan’s service that demonstrated a developing threat. These 
indicators included disobeying orders, argumentative behavior, poor work performance, 
disciplinary action, and the vocal condemnation of military operations in predominately 
Muslim countries that suggested disloyalty to the Constitution and the Army.6  There are 
a variety of other significant events in his personal life, such as the loss of immediate family 
members and being racially victimized after the September 11th terrorist attacks. It is 
assessed that these personal events, along with the professional issues, also contributed to 
Hasan’s rationalization towards committing his atrocities.7  Reports from fellow 
employees and supervisors within the Psychiatric Department insinuated that Hasan 
displayed paranoid, belligerent, and schizoid behaviors.8  Although many of the 
demonstrated behaviors and events occurred after Hasan enlisted and later commission as 
an officer in the Army, his behavioral precursors correspond with the fundamental 
framework concerning insider threats.  
Non-kinetic insider threats also have significant ramifications to national security. 
Depending on the objective of the attack, the results may lead to indirect loss of life similar 
to the insider events surrounding the unauthorized disclosure of classified documents by 
then PFC Bradley Manning. PFC Manning served as an Army Intelligence Analyst with a 
Top-Secret security clearance. While deployed to Iraq in 2010, PFC Manning transferred 
hundreds of thousands of documents and videos from classified servers to his personal 
computer using a writable compact disk.9   According to Army officials, PFC Manning 
 
6 Divya R Vargheese et al., Preventing Kinetic Insider Threat: Assessing Gaps in DoD Insider Threat 
Policy and Procedure, TR-17-09 (Seaside, CA: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center, 2017), 
15. 
7 Smith, Jaros, and Chandler, Foreground Factors of DoD Workplace Homicide: A Comparative Case 
Analysis of Incidents Between 2009-2015, 15–16. 
8 Daniel Zwerdlin, “Walter Reed Officials Asked: Was Hasan Psychotic?,” NPR, November 11, 2009, 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120313570. 
9 United States, Appellee V. Private First Class Bradley E. Manning (NKA Chelsea E. Manning) 
United States Army, Appellant, United States Court of Appeals (2018), 4. 
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then released the classified information, consisting of 250,000 Department of State 
diplomatic cables and 500,000 operational military reports to WikiLeaks.10  
The released information included sensitive as well as damaging material regarding 
U.S. detention facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, detainee reports, investigations 
concerning civilian casualties from U.S. military operations, future troop movements, and 
air-strike outcome reports. There is no doubt that the release of these classified documents 
disrupted military and diplomatic operations, damage the United States’ international 
reputation, and incited large-scale skepticism from the American populace. PFC Manning 
objected to many of the military’s methods in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. Overall, the 
base intent behind the release of the classified information was to promote unfiltered 
awareness of military actions, to include the countless civilian casualties, that occur 
throughout the course of conventional warfare.11 
PFC Manning’s court proceedings detailed personal diagnoses of suffering from 
anxiety as well as attributed personality disorder traits of narcissism and gender identity 
disorder prior to Manning joining the Army.12  Professionally, PFC Manning was routinely 
disciplined for poor performance, other aggressive outbursts, and striking a Non-
Commissioned Officer.13  It is important to note that, the armed forces acquisition 
processes for Military Intelligence positions, including the required Top-Secret Clearance 
review, either did not identify the diagnoses or did not disqualify PFC Manning from 
entering active-duty service in the first place. Manning was able to continue standard 
 
10 Julie Tate, “Pentagon Finally Releases Some Pre-Trial Documents from Bradley Manning Case,” 
The Washington Post, February 27, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/02/
27/pentagon-finally-releases-some-pre-trial-documents-from-bradley-manning-case/. 
11 Charlie Savage, “Soldier Admits Providing Files to WikiLeaks,” The New York Times, February 28, 
2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/01/us/bradley-manning-admits-giving-trove-of-military-data-to-
wikileaks.html. 
12 Matthew Jacobson, “The Pathological Twisting of Bradley Manning: Part One,” Saybrook 
University New Existentialist Posts, December 4, 2013, https://www.saybrook.edu/blog/2013/12/04/12-04-
13/; and Serena Marshall, “Bradley Manning Apologizes; Defense Cites Rough Childhood, Gender Identity 
Disorder,” ABC News, August 14, 2013, https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/08/bradley-manning-
apologizes-for-espionage-defense-cites-rough-childhood-gender-disorder. 
13 Josh Gerstein, “Witnesses: Bradley Manning Boasted of Leak, Had Mental Problems,” Politico, 
December 20, 2011, https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2011/12/witnesses-bradley-manning-
boasted-of-leak-had-mental-problems-108230. 
7 
military duties as well as deploying to Iraq even after the severe professional misconduct 
events, command-level evaluations, and psychological screenings that documented the 
unstable issues and adverse action. The evaluations also did not instigate a revocation or 
temporary suspension of PFC Manning’s Top-Secret Clearance. After a review of PFC 
Manning’s history and actions, the various issues were well known; however, there were 
many failures throughout the various screening systems that were supposed to identify and 
prevent such potential threats.  
Another widely known event concerning the release of classified material that 
caused damaged to U.S. national security was conducted by a DOD federal civilian 
contractor, Edward Snowden. While working in various positions for the National Security 
Agency (NSA), Snowden obtained access and downloaded classified material onto a 
personal hard-drive with the intent to distribute that information publicly. In 2013, after 
months of downloading 1.5 million documents, he released as many as 9,000 classified 
documents to the Washington Post and a reporter for the Guardian, Glenn Greenwald.14  
Greenwald published multiple articles concerning the classified documents as well as 
posted the majority of the documents online. Therefore, anyone in the world with internet 
access was able to view the classified documents including United States adversaries. 
These released documents caused significant harm to the United States’ national security 
as many of the documents contain DOD critical defense capabilities but the exact specifics 
of the damage have been redacted by the U.S. government due to the related classified 
material.15   
The detailed government report surrounding the Snowden case didn’t identify 
significant mental health disorder diagnoses prior to him working for government agencies. 
The lack of actual diagnoses does not necessarily signal that there weren’t these types of 
pre-existing issues, simply that Snowden may not have been treated or evaluated prior to 
his employment. According to reports, Snowden passed routine psychological exams while 
 
14 Review Of The Unauthorized Disclosures of Former National Security Agency Contractor Edward 
Snowden (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2016), 20. 




working for the CIA.16  Despite this, the exact CIA psychological screening tools, 
evaluation criteria, and thresholds for failure are not available in open-source 
documentation. It is possible that Snowden embodied sub-clinical disorders that didn’t 
register above the criteria to incite concern for his specific position by CIA standards for 
their psychological assessments to include being unofficially described as an anti-social, 
narcissist who lacked empathy through post-hoc analysis of his actions and comments.17 
The Snowden government report did reveal; however, that he demonstrated 
negative behavioral indicators and poor work performance issues that can be associated 
with pre-existing personality disorders. These indicators included repeated interpersonal 
relationship issues as well as disobedience with supervisors and fellow employees, 
exhibited frustration with lack of access to classified information outside of his 
occupational scope, and openly stated that the United States government was exceeding 
authorities on surveillance programs to foreign nationals while in China.18  Additionally, 
according to co-workers Snowden defended the actions of PFC Manning to illegally release 
classified documents to WikiLeaks.19  In hindsight, the threat indicators should have 
triggered supervisors and fellow employees to further investigate his daily activities. 
Unfortunately, Snowden was able to commit his insider attack causing significant 
harm to U.S. national security and then escape from justice. Snowden eventually reached 
an internal threshold that drove him to justify committing these acts in revenge or simply 
anger. In this case, Snowden was viewed as a “whistle-blower” by some and others as a 
 
16 Robert Windrem, Tom Winter, and Mike Brunker, “Edward Snowden’s Motive Revealed: He Can 
‘Sleep at Night,’” NBC News, May 28, 2014, https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-
interview/edward-snowdens-motive-revealed-he-can-sleep-night-n116851. 
17 Charlie Allen et al., “Assessing the Mind of the Malicious Insider: Using a Behavioral Model and 
Data Analytics to Improve Continuous Evaluation,” Intelligence and National Security Alliance, April 
2017, 9–10; Jack Devine, “Snowden Is The Kind of Guy I Used to Recruit in Russia,” Politico, May 13, 
2014, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/snowden-is-the-kind-of-guy-i-used-to-recruitin-
russia-106648; and Romesh Renesar, “The Unbearable Narcissism of Edward Snowden,” Bloomberg 
Businessweek, November 1, 2013, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-01/the-unbearable-
narcissism-of-edward-snowden. 
18 Review Of The Unauthorized Disclosures of Former National Security Agency Contractor Edward 
Snowden, 3–8. 
19 Review Of The Unauthorized Disclosures of Former National Security Agency Contractor Edward 
Snowden, 16. 
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civil-disobedient for his actions.20  Snowden appears to self-identify as a whistle-blower 
that acted rationally to disclose illegal government actions to the public.21  Regardless of 
the nature of the information contained in classified documents or the supposed altruistic 
motives, the unauthorized and improper release of classified material cannot be permitted 
for national security reasons. The comprehensive government review of the Snowden case 
ultimately reinforced the inherent internal human-risks associated with national security in 
the DOD Federal Civilian workforce.  
2. DOD Misconduct 
In addition to the most egregious insider threats previously discussed, the DOD 
experiences other forms of federal civilian employee adverse actions including drug and 
alcohol abuse, embezzlement, assault, security violations, sexual assault, and other 
misconduct infractions. All forms of adverse action negatively affect the DOD’s ability to 
execute its various missions or create hostile and toxic climates that hinders efficiency. 
Overall, the DOD faces an average of 17,000 cases annually for federal civilian employees 
requiring administrative disciplinary actions consisting of 10,000 suspensions, 7,000 
removals, and 115 demotions for misconduct.22  Unfortunately, these statistics may not 
fully represent the true number of misconduct events and adverse actions concerning 
federal civilian employees. A recent DOD investigation suggests that federal agencies are 
underreporting security-related adverse actions as well as general misconduct.23  
Therefore, the DOD federal civilian misconduct statistics are considered higher than 
reported.  
 
20 Kimberley Brownlee, “The Civil Disobedience of Edward Snowden: A Reply to William 
Scheuerman,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 42, no. 10 (December 2016): 967, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0191453716631167. 
21 Barton Gellman, Aaron Blake, and Miller, Greg, “Edward Snowden Comes Forward as Source of 
NSA Leaks,” The Washington Post, June 9, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/intelligence-
leaders-push-back-on-leakers-media/2013/06/09/fff80160-d122-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html. 
22 Federal Employee Misconduct, GAO-18-48 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 
2018), 1. 
23 Rene M. Dickerhoof et al., Personnel Security Underreporting: Establishing Rates and Estimating 
the Problem (Seaside, CA: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center, 2019), 32. 
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With regards to the armed forces, the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 
provides military commanders with various options to investigate, charge, and punish 
personnel for violation of the established codes for minor offenses as well as severe crimes. 
The majority of infractions or misconduct cases do not require a general court martial 
proceeding, similar to a civilian trial, and are conducted by commanders at lower echelons 
called a summary court-martial. In 2018, the armed forces concluded 37,132 summary 
courts-martials resulting in administrative actions from misconduct.24  A summary court-
martial typically involves minor offenses consisting of non-judicial punishments that do 
not require dishonorable discharges or confinement up to a year.25  For more severe 
offenses and crimes, the armed forces convicted 1,530 personnel through either general or 
special courts-martial in 2018, as well.  
Although the annual number of cases misconduct is considered to be at a low and 
manageable level for both military personnel and federal civilian employees, severe 
misconduct can lead to additional future problems as highlighted in the three catastrophic 
insider attacks from Hasan, Manning, and Snowden. All three of these insider cases 
involved disciplinary action associated with their professional careers prior to committing 
their attacks. Simple misconduct, in general, also disrupts workflow and creates 
unnecessary distractions that hinder focus towards the wide array of requirements to 
achieve the mission of defending the United States. Suspending, terminating employees, 
or discharging military personnel, due to misconduct, creates additional workforce gaps as 
well as expends organizational resources and time to reconstitute.26 
C. CAPSTONE REPORT OBJECTIVE 
There is no doubt that eliminating misconduct and catastrophic insider-threats is 
important for the DOD on various levels. The three catastrophic insider threat events, 
described in the previous section, as well as the consistent occurrence of misconduct within 
 
24 Reports of the Services on Military Justice for Fiscal Year 2018 (Washington, DC: Joint Service 
Committee on Military Justice, 2019). 
25 “Manual for Courts-Martial United States” (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2019), V1. 
26 Federal Employee Misconduct, 6. 
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the federal civilian workforce and armed forces provide ample justification for the 
requirement to improve DOD acquisition methodologies. Based on these recurring threats 
and misconduct within the DOD, President Barrack Obama issued a memorandum 
Executive Order 13587 requiring federal agencies to improve vetting procedures for 
employees with access to classified networks as well as an official memorandum to 
improve the federal hiring processes to promote better workforce acquisition,27  In 
conjunction with President Obamas orders, the Secretary of Defense also issued Directive 
5205.16 in 2014 to establish “policy and assign responsibilities within DOD to develop 
and maintain an insider threat program to comply with the requirements and minimum 
standards to prevent, deter, detect, and mitigate the threat insiders may pose to DOD and 
U.S. Government installations, facilities, personnel, missions, or resources”.28 
These mandates unfortunately only establish end-state requirements of eliminating 
malicious insider threat activity and did not provide methodological procedures or official 
implementation policies towards that cause. Therefore, the DOD has promoted agencies, 
such as PERSEREC to research, analyze, and develop methodologies to combat threats 
from internal personnel. Currently, many counter-insider threat approaches simply focus 
on the training and education of employees to identify and report specific behaviors 
associated with historic insider threat occurrences. Unfortunately, internal personnel 
review processes of current employees are susceptible to failure such as in all three insider 
threat cases previously mentioned. Since the authorization of the executive orders, DOD 
directives, and lessons learned from failed internal personnel reviews, no distinct DOD 
policies have not occurred to incite enhanced methods within the human acquisition 
process to hire new candidates that do not demonstrate the dispositioned vulnerabilities 
that lead to future misconduct and insider attacks.  
 
27 Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and 
Safeguarding of Classified Information, vol. 76, EO 13587 (Washington, DC: Federal Register, 2011), 1; 
and Presidential Memorandum -- Improving the Federal Recruitment and Hiring Process (Washington, 
DC: The White House, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/presidential-
memorandum-improving-federal-recruitment-and-hiring-process. 
28 The DOD Insider Threat Program, DoD Directive 5205.16 (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2014). 
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The statistical relevance surrounding the DOD personnel problems, associated 
misconduct, and significant insider threat activities, concerning the DOD civilian federal 
workforce and military service members, reinforces the need for reformed methodologies 
specifically directed towards the human capital acquisition process. In accordance with 
PERSEREC research objectives, this capstone report’s direct intent will focus efforts to 
promote scientific-based screening approaches within the DOD human capital acquisition 
phase by utilizing innovative assessment methodologies. The “whole-person” assessment 
concept is a model implemented by the SFAS course utilizes multiple self-report diagnostic 
evaluation tools to screen each candidate against metrics and criterion that support the 
acquisition of Soldiers possessing the desired characteristics of Special Forces operators. 
Specific mental health and personality diagnostic assessments provide SFAS cadre with 
data surrounding disqualifying conditions to select stable candidates that do not exhibit 
critical predisposition threat indicators deemed undesirable for service within the 1st 
Special Forces Regiment. 
The SFAS model demonstrates an innovative approach to target those negative 
indicators that can be widely replicated throughout the entirety of the DOD acquisition 
processes for both military personnel and federal civilian workforce. As cited previously, 
the DOD has already implemented internal security procedures in the attempt to alleviate 
insider attacks and misconduct for current personnel. Although, these implemented 
procedures mitigate some of the adverse actions, there are still opportunities to further 
reduce the threats. Prioritizing methodologies in the acquisition phase is absolutely a 
necessary starting point, as it is the very beginning of the human capital continuum and 
provides an approach at the inception of the process.  
This report develops a base model, called the Enhanced Assessment Program, that 
incorporates additional evaluation methodologies that target critical predisposition threat 
indicators observed in historical insider attacks and cases of severe misconduct to mitigate 
selecting personnel that commit those actions. The next chapter outlines the current DOD 
human capital acquisition process, for both federal civilian’s and the armed services, as 
well as provide an overview of the SFAS course methodology. This facilitates the 
identification of gaps and opportunities to justify the implementation of the Enhanced 
13 
Assessment Program in the acquisition process to mitigate future adverse actions, 
misconduct, criminal offenses, and insider attacks that cause harm to the security of the 
United States. The Enhanced Assessment Program is designed to be scalable to current 
DOD acquisition capabilities without overbearing the process while also minimizing 
excessive financial costs. 
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II. DOD HUMAN CAPITAL ACQUISITION PROCESSES  
A. HUMAN CAPITAL ACQUISITION OVERVIEW 
Most organizations and businesses, both public and private, have different 
missions, structures, and ideals that make them unique, requiring organizations to develop 
their own set values and methodologies to recruit, hire, develop, and employ their 
workforce. All organizations establish specific Human Capital Management (HCM) 
methodologies that prioritize their workforces as a high-level strategic resource that is the 
ultimate driver of a competitive advantage based on their mission or objectives.29  The vast 
majority of U.S. organizations focus their HCM efforts primarily on enhancing their 
workforce through internal employee development and optimization methodologies to 
promote enhanced performance and results after they are hired.30  Additionally, most 
attempt to select the best candidates to hire based on the traditional human capital 
acquisition methodology through a review process of their described knowledge, skills, 
and abilities (KSA) as well as their professional experience.31  The current DOD HCM 
process utilizes these same principle approaches as with comparable large organizations. 
This chapter outlines the general DOD federal civilian and armed forces acquisition 
processes to demonstrate the current gaps and future opportunities to initiate improved 
assessment procedures. The ultimate goal is to increase the selection of new personnel that 
are not mentally or behaviorally predisposed to committing insider attacks or engage in 
 
29 Stephen Young, “10 Steps to Successful Human Capital Management,” Strategic HR Review 5, no. 1 
(November 2005): 24–27; and Mária Sibilová et al., “Information Systems for the Support of Human 
Capital Management,” Research Papers Faculty of Materials Science and Technology Slovak University of 
Technology 27, no. s1 (December 1, 2019): 8–14. 
30 Corine Boon et al., “Integrating Strategic Human Capital and Strategic Human Resource 
Management,” The International Journal of Human Resource Management 29, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 
34–35; and Sibilová et al., “Information Systems for the Support of Human Capital Management,” 9. 
31 David E. Bowen, Gerald E. Ledford, and Barry R. Nathan, “Hiring for the Organization, Not the 
Job,” Academy of Management Perspectives 5, no. 4 (April 1991): 35–51; Michael T. Brannick, Adrienne 
Cadle, and Edward L. Levine, Job Analysis for Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and Other Characteristics, 
Predictor Measures, and Performance Outcomes (Oxford University Press, 2012); and Robert E. Ployhart, 
Benjamin Schneider, and Neal Schmitt, Staffing Organizations: Contemporary Practice and Theory, 3. ed 
(Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publ, 2006). 
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misconduct throughout the acquisition phase. This objective will require the development 
of manageable, streamlined enhancements that do not restrict the DOD’s ability to meet 
military end-strength goals or fill critical civilian positions. Assessing the two current DOD 
acquisition processes is necessary to determine to vital areas to insert improved procedures 
rather than entirely restructuring them. 
B. FEDERAL CIVILIAN ACQUISITION PROCESS 
As previously cited, the federal government has directed the establishment of new 
acquisition procedures to reduce hiring civilian employees that ultimately degrade the 
organization’s capability or security through misconduct and insider-attacks. Therefore, it 
is necessary to review and analyze the current DOD human capital acquisition process for 
federal civilian positions in order to identify gaps or opportunities to enhance the process 
to select better candidates. Generally, the DOD federal civilian hiring procedures primarily 
assess a candidate’s KSAs, experience, as well as conduct background checks or security 
clearance investigations, as necessary for more sensitive positions, and finally one or more 
personal interviews are conducted by the hiring agency. 
All DOD federal civilian candidates must apply for their desired positions utilizing 
the USAJOBS federal government website. USAJOBs is a centralized acquisition database 
that facilitates recruitment for available positions and supports the initial application 
process to the required federal agencies in the United States that includes the Department 
of Defense.32  Federal civilian candidates must adhere to the following detailed online 
application procedures as define by the USAJOBS acquisition process (see Figure 1) 
 




Figure 1. Current DOD Federal Civilian Acquisition Process.33 
The represented USAJOBS federal civilian acquisition process unequivocally the 
prioritizes the screening of candidates KSAs and experience. The specific agency’s hiring 
official is responsible for further refining the candidate pool base on their established 
interview process. Finally, all suitability and security clearance investigations are 
conducted after a job offer is made by the hiring official to ensure a trustworthy candidate 
is selected. Unfortunately, background and security clearance investigations are limited to 
 
33 “Federal Civilian Application Process,” USAJOBS, October 9, 2020, https://www.usajobs.gov/Help/
faq/application/process/. 
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methods verifying a candidate’s suitability through assessing their historical behavior 
through verifiable records or personal references. The investigations screen for past 
unfavorable conduct, criminal records, negative financial considerations, foreign influence, 
drug and alcohol abuse, mental health disorders, and security violations.34 
Negative reporting concerning a single screening criterion will not necessarily 
result in a disqualification for a security clearance or unsuitable determination.35  For 
example, a criminal record or previous incarceration is not an absolute disqualifying basis 
for federal civilian employment, depending on the type or degree of conviction.36  
Mandated disqualifying offenses involve sex crimes, drug felonies, violent crimes, and 
other offenses concerning child victims.37  A candidate will be considered unsuitable or 
disqualified for a clearance when unfavorable documented records or concerning behaviors 
are identified by the investigators that exceed specific thresholds. It is extremely difficult 
to disqualify a candidate for a security clearance when historical documentation does not 
exist based on the investigation process. A candidate may have a mental health disorder 
and has never been evaluated by a medical provider. They may engage in criminal 
behaviors or abuse illegal drugs but have never been arrested for such an offense. 
Therefore, there is no historical documentation within these scenarios for an investigator 
to provide an unfavorable determination. 
Few federal agencies currently incorporate additional screening measures for 
candidates based on the sensitivity of certain positions. Of note, the Department of Energy 
Human Reliability Program and the Department of Defense Personnel Reliability Program 
require additional security clearance and counter-intelligence investigations, medical 
examinations, psychological testing, and drug screening concerning positions with 
 
34 Suitability Adjudications, 5 C.F.R. 731 § (2012), 34. 
35 Adjudication Process, 32 C.F.R. 147 § (2014), 695. 
36 “Can I Work for the Government If I Have a Criminal Record?,” USAJOBS, October 14, 2020, 
https://www.usajobs.gov/Help/faq/application/eligibility/ex-offender/. 
37 Criminal History Background Check Procedures, 32 C.F.R 86 § (2012), 424. 
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responsibilities related to nuclear weapons, equipment, or materials.38  Federal Bureau of 
Investigations Special Agent candidates must conduct physical examinations, medical 
reviews, drug screening, and complete a polygraph test.39  These types of expanded 
screening procedure for new candidates are valuable but are not currently widespread 
approaches within the federal civilian hiring process due to the excessive resources 
required for implementation.  
C. ARMED FORCES ACQUISITION PROCESS 
The armed forces acquisition process differs from the DOD federal civilian process 
in various ways. Military recruits initiate the application process through a local recruiting 
station for one of the branches of the military. Those local recruiters are responsible for 
facilitating the acquisition process for each recruit to ensure they satisfy the initial 
eligibility requirements for service, submit all required documentation, and complete 
screening examinations through the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS). 
Although each branch of the military incorporates slightly different metrics and criteria to 
assess a recruit’s viability for specific military occupational specialties (MOS), the DOD 
mandates an overarching acquisition process that applies to all branches in the armed 
services for both commissioned officers and enlisted personnel.40  Specific criteria differ 
by service concerning age requirements, physical fitness testing, height and weight 
standards, and educational requirements. Every armed service recruit must satisfy 
minimum eligibility requirements in order to enter military service through their local 
recruiting station and MEPS (see Figure 2). 
 
38 Human Reliability Program, 10 C.F.R. 712 § (2018), 18201–5; Nuclear Weapons Personnel 
Reliability Program, DOD 5210.42-R (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018); and Jessica A 
Baweja et al., An Evaluation of the Utility of Expanding Psychological Screening to Prevent Insider 
Attacks, TR-19-05 (Seaside, CA: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center, 2019), 18. 
39 Special Agent Selection Process (Quantico, VA: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2020), 7. 




Figure 2. Current Armed Forces Acquisition Process.41 
The armed forces provide a regimented training pipeline for each MOS and 
therefore do not prioritize a candidates KSAs or previous experience. Specialty training 
ensures that graduating personnel achieve the required KSAs to fulfill their future MOS 
duties and responsibilities. KSAs are only prioritized for candidates with professional 
degrees seeking to receive a direct commission to enter service within the Medical Corps, 
Judge Advocate General Corps, and the Chaplain Corps.42  These specialties require 
 
41 “Becoming an Officer,” Department of Defense Today’s Military, October 15, 2020, 
https://www.todaysmilitary.com/joining-eligibility/becoming-military-officer; andv“Eligibility 
Requirements.” 
42 “Becoming an Officer.” 
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recruits that have earned professional degrees, specific certifications, and experience to 
fulfill the duties and responsibilities after entering service. 
Overall, the objective of the armed forces’ acquisition process is to ensure that a 
selected recruit meets the base requirements for service, is physically capable of serving in 
the tentative MOS, and embodies a good moral character.43  The MEPS process and 
associated testing ensure the physical fitness requirements and knowledge prerequisites to 
fulfill the service obligations of a specific MOS. Drug testing and criminal background 
checks facilitate the final screening requirement to identify any historical conduct that 
negatively exceeds the expected armed forces morality standards. Similar to the DOD 
federal civilian hiring process, arrests and incarceration will not necessarily eliminate a 
recruit from entering service. Certain felony convictions require a detailed review of the 
circumstances and a waiver to enter service.44  Any offense involving sex crimes, drug 
felonies, violent crimes, and other offenses concerning child victims will automatically 
disqualify a recruit from entering service.  
The MEPS acquisition process does not currently incorporate initial pre-screening 
mental health assessments for recruits during the application process. Recruits may be 
disqualified for certain mental health and behavioral disorders, if reported by the recruit or 
identified through the MEPS examination process.45  MEPS mental health screening is 
limited to an initial application questionnaire and a brief interview with a medical physician 
for recruits to voluntarily disclose the existence of prior diagnoses, hospitalizations, or 
treatments regarding mental health conditions.46  Further evaluation with behavioral 
experts or psychologist only occurs when a condition is reported by the recruit or suspected 
by a medical physician at MEPS. Those mental health evaluations provide a clinical 
 
43 “Eligibility Requirements.” 
44 “An Arrest Record Could Keep You From Enlisting,” Military.com, October 18, 2020, 
https://www.military.com/join-armed-forces/disqualifiers-law.html. 
45 Report on Preliminary Mental Health Screenings for Individuals (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2016), 6; and Medical Standards for Appointment, Enlistment, or Induction into the Military 
Services, DOD Instruction 6130.03 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 44–46. 
46 Report on Preliminary Mental Health Screenings for Individuals, 5–6. 
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medical assessment to qualify or disqualify a recruit for entering military service.47  These 
procedures are problematic as a recruit can intentionally neglect to disclose a previously 
diagnosed condition and pervious research indicates that recruits often do not disclose 
those conditions during the MEPS process.48  Additionally, recruits may have a mental 
health condition that has not been identified or diagnosed at the time of enlistment. Without 
a pre-screening assessment during the application, it is extremely difficult for MEPS 
medical providers to identify a significant mental health condition. 
Accessing medical records for recruits is an important method for MEPS personnel 
to verify pre-existing diagnoses or hospitalizations for a specific recruit. The DOD is 
currently developing the Military Health System GENESIS electronic medical record 
system for MEPS to gain access to recruits’ official medical records. The GENESIS system 
is intended to synchronize medical record information with federal government agencies 
and participating federal private medical facilities for MEPS medical providers to gain 
access to a recruit’s records.49  The official implementation of the system is unknown and 
until it is implemented MEPS will continue to rely on recruits self-reporting their medical 
and mental health conditions. 
D. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES ASSESSMENT AND SELECTION COURSE 
In addition to the initial armed forces acquisition process, there are internal branch 
selection and assessment processes that military personnel must complete in order to 
transition to a new MOS or to serve in specialized units after joining a service. Most U.S. 
special operations forces utilize extensive acquisition methodologies and metrics that 
involve a multitude of physical, medical, psychological, and intelligence screening 
assessments to select the best candidates for service within these critical units. The Army 
Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) course is an innovative methodology that 
incorporates a comprehensive approach that extensively evaluates each individual 
 
47 Report on Preliminary Mental Health Screenings for Individual, 5–6.  
48 Report on Preliminary Mental Health Screenings for Individual, 12. 
49 Improvements Needed in the Management of Enlistees’ Medical Early Separation and Enlistment 
Information, GAO-17-527 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2017), 23–24. 
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candidate through scientific assessments. The SFAS course is a demanding three-week 
course designed to test a candidate’s physical and mental capability. In 2012, the course 
was redesigned to incorporate a scientific-based methodology of qualitative and 
quantitative criterion to select the best candidates. The overall intent of the redesigned 
course is to evaluate a candidate through enhanced screening procedures focused on a 
“whole-person” selection concept assessing six defined character attributes of physical 
fitness, intelligence, trainability, judgement, influence, and motivation.50  The 
methodology compiles data from each event, examination, and objective performance 
evaluations into a set of classified metrics to evaluate each candidate against the six desired 
Special Forces attributes. Of note, the SFAS course incorporates criteria compiled from 
various mental health and personality trait diagnostic screening to support the “whole-
person” selection concept. 
SFAS is a rather extensive selection process. Recruits must first apply to attend the 
SFAS course due to maximum capacity restrictions for each class. The application process 
includes initial screening requirements to ensure recruits are highly qualified, physically 
fit, have not committed misconduct or a UCMJ offense, and that they satisfy SFAS 
minimum eligibility requirements.51  Additional screening includes a thorough medical 
examination, a review of military performance evaluations, and the initiation of a secret 
security clearance investigation including civilian criminal history checks.52  Recruits that 
are accepted to attend SFAS as candidates complete more in-depth, rigorous assessment 
methods throughout the course 
Emphasis is placed on the first week of SFAS to initially assess each candidate as 
an individual by exploiting their strengths and weaknesses through extensive stress induced 
evaluations.53  The battery of examinations determines a candidate’s initial physical 
 
50 Steve Balestrieri, Selecting a Better Green Beret, Interview with Brian Decker, June 2, 2017, 
https://sofrep.com/specialoperations/selecting-better-green-beret-interview-brian-decker-pt-2/. 
51 “Qualifications and Opportunities of Being a Special Forces Soldier,” Go Army, October 2020, 
https://www.goarmy.com/special-forces/qualifications-and-benefits.html. 
52 In-Service Special Force Recruiting Program, USAREC Pamphlet 601-25 (Fort Knox, KY: United 
States Army Recruiting Command, 2006), 6–7. 
53 Two Weeks in Hell, directed by Bobby Williams (Discovery Channel, 2011). 
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potential, mental health and resiliency, personality traits, and cognitive skills.54  Each day 
throughout the first week, candidates that do not achieve the minimum required scores are 
eliminated from the course and are unable to proceed with further evaluation.55  The 
objective is to initially eliminate candidates that do not embody the necessary attributes to 
withstand the rigors of austere, combat environments associated with Special Forces 
operations.56  All candidates must successfully achieve the required minimum scores in 
order to progress to the second week of SFAS. It is important to note that SFAS assessors 
do not provide performance feedback to candidates at any time throughout the course.57  
SFAS candidates are also unaware of the minimum required scores for each event or 
examination they complete. Testing throughout the first week includes various 
combinations of examinations involving physical, academic, and mental health 
assessments. The following list of events and screening protocols are historical examples 
of assessments utilized throughout SFAS over the last decade (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. SFAS Screening Events.58 
 
54 Emily K. Farina et al., “Physical Performance, Demographic, Psychological, and Physiological 
Predictors of Success in the U.S. Army Special Forces Assessment and Selection Course,” Physiology & 
Behavior 210 (October 2019): 1–7. 
55 Farina et al., 1–2. 
56 Balestrieri, Selecting a Better Green Beret. 
57 In-Service Special Force Recruiting Program, 4. 
58 In-Service Special Force Recruiting Program, 4; Farina et al., “Physical Performance, Demographic, 
Psychological, and Physiological Predictors of Success in the U.S. Army Special Forces Assessment and 
Selection Course,” 1–7. 
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Candidates that progress to the second and third week of SFAS complete events to 
evaluate physical capabilities, teamwork, leadership, and mental resiliency towards 
assessing the individual character attributes. Week 2 consists primarily of multiple 
iterations of long-range land navigation tests by foot carrying a weighted rucksack.59  
Candidates that succeed in locating the required amount of assigned points, while 
maintaining their integrity by following the strict navigation course guidelines, will 
proceed to the third and final week. The final week includes complex tasks involving 
moving heavy, awkward equipment over long distances with a team of 12–16 randomly 
selected candidates.60  Individual candidates are evaluated on their performance in the final 
week through a specific rating system from both the SFAS assessors and peer candidates 
from the assigned team at the completion of the events. Each candidate and SFAS assessor 
complete an objective performance evaluation questionnaire that ranks every team member 
in order from best to worst as well as evaluate each candidate according to the six 
attributes.61 
Candidates that satisfy or exceed the results for the desired attributes are ultimately 
selected at SFAS. From another perspective, candidates that fail to achieve the minimum 
required scores or demonstrate undesirable traits and behaviors are disqualified from 
contention. The most intriguing opportunities for further analysis are centered around the 
non-physical evaluations that focus on assessing the character of a candidate through the 
mental health, personality, and resiliency examinations. These non-physical screening 
procedures conducted in the first week of SFAS, such as the MMPI and CD-RISC 
assessments, are manageable self-report questionnaires that require minimal resources and 
funding to administer to determine the mental health and personality traits of a candidate. 
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) and Connor-Davidson 
Resilience Scale (CD-RISC) are utilized as initial screening tools at SFAS to identify 
tentative mental health disorder, personality disorders, or other concerning traits that would 
 
59 In-Service Special Force Recruiting Program, 4; Two Weeks in Hell.. 
60 Farina et al., “Physical Performance, Demographic, Psychological, and Physiological Predictors of 
Success in the U.S. Army Special Forces Assessment and Selection Course,” 3; and Two Weeks in Hell. 
61 Balestrieri, Selecting a Better Green Beret. 
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disqualify a candidate from future service in Special Forces. SFAS assessors include 
trained behavioral psychologists that support the selection process when tentative mental 
health and personality disorders as well as height and confinement phobias are identified 
in specific candidates.62  If the results of the MMPI and CD-RISC assessments indicate 
concerning disorders or traits, an in-person interview is conducted between the candidate 
and SFAS behavioral psychologists to confirm or deny those results.63  The psychologists 
ultimately provide a clinical evaluation from the interview to determine whether that 
candidate embodies disqualifying mental health or personality disorders deemed 
undesirable for service in Special Forces. 
The overall intent of this report is to identify proactive approaches that are scalable 
to enhance the DOD acquisition processes in order to mitigate insider-attacks and excessive 
misconduct. The SFAS methodology absolutely demonstrates that there are other 
considerations to incorporate into an acquisition process than simply prioritizing 
assessments based on a candidate’s KSAs. There is no doubt that the three-week SFAS 
course is absolutely an extensive acquisition process that is resource intensive, time 
consuming, and unnecessary for non-military organizations. Those challenging physical 
selection events conducted throughout the course and especially the last two weeks are not 
the focus of this report. 
The redesigned SFAS intent to institute an acquisition process to assess the entirety 
of the candidates’ character and behavior, through the “whole-person” concept, utilizing 
science-based assessment provides a revolutionary approach to screening the entirety of 
the candidate. Specifically, the use of mental health and personality screening to identify 
undesirable characteristics or disorders promotes manageable procedures to enhance the 
DOD acquisition process to mitigate future misconduct and insider threats. The majority 
of recent malicious insider-attack perpetrators were either diagnosed or exhibited 
characteristics with significant mental illness disorders and personality disorders. Of 
course, there are additional factors other than mental health disorders and personality traits 
 
62 Two Weeks in Hell. 
63 “Special Forces Psych Eval,” Inside the G-Base, January 2018, http://insidethegbase.com/the-psych-
eval/. 
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that must be accounted for to effectively characterize insider-attacks and misconduct. The 
next chapter focuses analysis through historical evidence to better interpret the influences 
and indicators associated with insider-attack perpetrators and personnel that commit 
misconduct with the DOD. 
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III. INSIDER THREAT FRAMEWORK AND PERSONNEL 
MISCONDUCT ANALYSIS 
A. MALICIOUS INSIDER THREAT FRAMEWORK 
An entire research report could be generated concerning the associated indicators, 
mental health factors, behavioral characteristics, and social distinctions that drive an 
individual’s intent to commit a malicious action towards their country, organization, or 
fellow employees. Summarizing the important themes and motivations will capture the 
basic understanding from extensive research conducted by behavioral and social scientists. 
Therefore, this capstone report will underscore the accepted science and analytical 
conclusions based on the inherent personal background, organizational influences, and 
historical indicators that are associated with recent insider attacks. 
The malicious framework of insider threat activity is characterized by an individual 
that historically exhibits negative behavioral attributes, such as misconduct, crime, or 
violations, embodies concerning mental and personality disorders, and experiences a 
serious precipitating event considered the catalyst that provides the final motivation for the 
attack.64  As previously discussed, PFC Bradley, Major Hasan, and Snowden all 
demonstrated the defined characterization of this malicious framework for insider threats. 
These factors; however, are not unique to only the most horrific and catastrophic attacks. 
Lesser known insider attacks that resulted in loss of life or espionage, accompany the very 
same characteristics.65  Unfortunately, these characterizations are exceptionally broad and 
 
64 M., Creese, S., Wright, G., & Whitty, M., “Understanding Insider Threat: A Framework for 
Characterizing Attacks” (IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops, University of Leicester, UK, 2014), 217; 
Frank L. Greitzer and Ryan E. Hohimer, “Modeling Human Behavior to Anticipate Insider Attacks,” 
Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 2 (June 2011): 33; and S. L. Pfleeger, J. B. Predd, J. Hunker and C. 
Bulford, “Insiders Behaving Badly: Addressing Bad Actors and Their Actions,” vol. 5, 1, 2010, 172. 
65 Catina M Smith, Stephanie L Jaros, and Callie J Chandler, Foreground Factors of DoD Workplace 
Homicide: A Comparative Case Analysis of Incidents Between 2009-2015, TR-17-01 (Seaside, CA: 
Defense Personnel and Security Research Center, 2016); Allen et al., “Assessing the Mind of the Malicious 
Insider: Using a Behavioral Model and Data Analytics to Improve Continuous Evaluation,” 3–7; and Eric 
D Shaw and Harley V Stock, “Behavioral Risk Indicators of Malicious Insider Theft of Intellectual 
Property: Misreading the Writing on the Wall,” American Board of Forensic Psychology, 2011., 30. 
30 
require further dissection to support evidence-based solutions utilizing behavioral science 
framework to narrow the critical factors. 
In the most fundamental sense, a malicious insider threat event requires an 
individual actor and a targeted organization or their personnel. As documented by a recent 
report by the DOD Personnel and Security Research Center, every individual’s personal 
background, history, and various social associations are all important aspects towards their 
state of mind in conjunction with organizational factors related with their professional life 
that incite their future action.66  Supporting reports outside of DOD-specific analysis also 
conclude that a multitude of personal and professional issues within an individual’s life 
culminate towards a decision to conduct an attack.67  Therefore, an individual’s social 
community, family, mental health, education, and criminal background all contribute to the 
well-being of that individual. On the other side, the organizational factors consisting of 
culture, climate, leadership, and interpersonal relationships determine the surrounding 
environment for an individual, as well. Combining the aspects from the individual’s 
personal life, mental health, and the organizational influences essentially encompass the 
supporting factors that drive the motivation and willingness for an individual to progress 
along the described “insider attack pathway” models. 
These recent studies concerning insider threat analysis have produced similar 
models based on a personal profile of the individual as well as their demonstrated “insider 
attack pathway” that builds over time that provides the rationalization to commit a 
malicious action against an organization or population.68  These models all incorporate the 
varying aspects of the individual’s personal, professional, and organizational 
characteristics that eventually manifest to a level for the individual to conduct a minor 
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Mind of the Malicious Insider: Using a Behavioral Model and Data Analytics to Improve Continuous 
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33. 
31 
infraction or misconduct at work. The initial minor misconduct or infraction exacerbates 
the pre-existing personality disorders, mental disorders, and internal stressors which then 
escalate to additional personal or professional issues leading to a moderate form of 
misconduct. The cycle continues until a final major insider attack occurs after a perceived 
injustice or significant life event that enhances the individual’s negative emotions and 
strains their mental well-being.69  A perceived injustice or significant life event typically 
provides the final motive for the individual to rationalize and justify the attack. Most insider 
attack motives surround revenge, ideology, personal gain, desperation or despair.70  
It is not simply the presence of anger, stress, or misconduct exhibited by an 
individual along the Insider Attack Pathway that foments an attack as depicted by the 
framework. An individual’s mental health and historical background typically influence or 
motivate that individual to actively progress throughout the Insider Attack Pathway. The 
influential factors are summarized by the five categories spanning mental health, physical 
health, behavioral history, personality traits, and exposure to significant life events 
classified as the Vulnerable Predisposition Profile (VPP). The suggested Composite Insider 
Threat Framework combines all the various inputs from previously established “insider 
threat pathway” models in conjunction with the developed VPP to provide a visual 
representation of the science-based theory (see Figure 4). 
 
69 Allen et al., “Assessing the Mind of the Malicious Insider: Using a Behavioral Model and Data 
Analytics to Improve Continuous Evaluation,” 7. 
70 Smith, Jaros, and Chandler, Foreground Factors of DoD Workplace Homicide, 10–12. 
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Figure 4. Composite Insider Threat Framework.71 
B. INSIDER THREAT FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS 
Analysis of the various accepted insider threat models and research provide 
noticeable important similarities that occur both in violent and non-violent insider attacks. 
This report highlights those insider threat similarities while fusing notable conclusions 
from the extensive research into a straightforward, cohesive framework. The proposed 
Composite Insider Threat Framework is not an original concept, but rather a fusion of the 
multitude of observed inputs from the extensive insider threat research into a concise 
framework to facilitate innovative methodologies to combat a complex problem set.  
Overall, the Composite Insider Threat Framework is extensive as it attempts to 
incorporate considerations from every aspect of an individual’s personal and professional 
life as well as the organizational influences and actions that escalate to a catastrophic 
attack. The developed framework compiles two critical models associated with an insider 
attack separated into the Vulnerable Predisposition Profile and the Insider Attack Pathway 
to depict those key inputs. The VPP incorporates the five separate categories to provide a 
 
71 Adapted from Allen et al., “Assessing the Mind of the Malicious Insider: Using a Behavioral Model 
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holistic model to support the evaluation of the well-being and current mind-state of an 
individual. The Insider Attack Pathway model demonstrates the overarching sequence of 
events and stressors that a vulnerable individual generally follows before committing a 
major attack against an organization or fellow employees. 
Concerning the VPP, the mental health of an individual appears to contribute 
particularly to the fundamental intent of an individual to commit an inside attack. Specific 
Axis II personality disorders are attributed to enhancing the motivation for an individual to 
progress through the Insider Attack Pathway towards a major attack. An Axis II personality 
disorder is outlined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) 
as a clinical grouping of inflexible and maladaptive personality traits that manifest an 
enduring pattern of behavior in two or more areas of cognition, affectivity, interpersonal 
functioning, and impulse control in social situations.72   
An important two-part case study identified that specific combinations of 
personality disorders were often shared by insider threats. One combination consists of 
narcissism, anti-social, and paranoid personality disorders and the other combination 
includes avoidant and schizoid disorders.73  The narcissistic, anti-social, paranoid 
combination is significant due to their lack of general empathy for others as well as an 
exaggerated sense of self-entitlement that ultimately increases the individual’s power and 
revenge fantasies during periods of high stress levels.74   Although there are overlapping 
characteristics between the avoidant personality and the schizoid personality disorder, this 
combination is associated with individuals that incorporate traits of considerable distress 
and impairment.75  The avoidant-schizoid combination is consistent with individuals that 
are hypersensitive to negative evaluation, feelings of inadequacy, detachment from social 
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relationships, and limit their range of expression for emotions within interpersonal 
environments.76  These characteristics also enhance the corresponding risk of attack when 
coupled with an individual’s negative behavioral actions, stress provoked by significant 
life events, and workplace misconduct. 
Mental illness disorders have also been linked to malicious insider threats as 
contributing factors within documented reporting of recent DOD-related shootings 
conducted by Sergeant John Russell, Specialist Ricky Elder, Specialist Ivan Lopez, and 
Navy contractor Aaron Alexis. These individuals committed violent insider attacks while 
demonstrating mental illness criteria for one or multiple Axis I clinical disorders 
concerning generalized anxiety, delusions, major depression, and post-traumatic stress 
disorders.77   Analysis suggests that the mental illness disorder intensified their instability 
and well-being to ultimately influence their decision to commit their attacks. 
Unfortunately, mental illness disorders can develop at any time during an individual’s life 
and many are extremely difficult to observe in normal environments. Despite this, the 
predisposition of mental illness disorders must be accounted for within the Vulnerable 
Predisposition Profile for evaluation and analysis towards mitigating insider threats.  
This mental health analysis does not reinforce that anyone that is clinically 
diagnosed with either of the two combinations of personality disorders or the described 
mental illness disorders will ultimately commit misconduct or insider attacks. The evidence 
from the case studies suggests that the majority of individuals that progress through the 
insider threat framework towards a major attack embody components of personality 
disorders, mental illness disorders, or both and is a rather important indicator within the 
entire framework. Screening for certain mental health disorders can support early signaling 
of individuals susceptible to engaging in misconduct or identify individuals that are 
reaching a critical point of committing an insider threat attack after behavioral infractions 
or episodes of misconduct occur.  
 
76 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 
77 Smith, Jaros, and Chandler, Foreground Factors of DoD Workplace Homicide, 14. 
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An individual’s personality is assessed to also be a noteworthy factor within insider 
attacks. Specific personality traits, centered around the accepted Five-Factor Model, 
provide insight into the demeanor of an individual and a significant predisposition category 
in order to determine negative attributes or indicators when assessing a tentative insider 
threat. The Five-Factor Model consists of organizing personality traits into separate 
domains of Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness 
to Experience which is designed to provide an assessment determining an individual’s 
pattern of personality traits.78  As mentioned earlier, personality disorders are generated 
from an individual’s personality traits when the DSM’s disorder criteria are met. The 
assessed personality traits essentially represent an individual’s internal tendencies and 
responses towards various stimuli but is not an absolute predictor of their behavior or 
reaction to a specific situation. This does not necessarily signify that isolated personality 
traits are not able to play a role or provide indicators to mitigate insider activity with the 
absence of a clinical disorder. In fact, Five-Factor Model research and analysis concludes 
that specific personality domains facilitated the prediction of engagement in 
counterproductive work behaviors (CWB), misconduct, and increased risk of insider 
attacks. The research connected individuals that exhibit high neuroticism to impulsive 
aggression and low results in agreeableness predicted narcissistic aggression.79  There is 
also a direct correlation with low levels of conscientiousness and agreeableness as valid 
predictors for organizational deviance.80   
The behavioral history category within the VPP is another area that facilitates 
insight into a tentative threat. Reviewing previous criminal charges or arrests, prior 
misconduct, deviance, and aggression provides a set of indicators of an individual’s 
capability of continued violent and non-violent offenses. An individual that has engaged in 
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a criminal act, misconduct, or CWBs, typically continues in other negative acts which 
usually escalate to more severe forms of the behaviors and do not necessarily happen 
spontaneously.81  The same case studies concerning violent insider attacks involving 
homicide highlight that five of the six attackers reviewed previously committed a criminal 
act, engaged in workplace misconduct, or had a history of aggression with many of them 
being involved in multiple events.82  Historical behaviors, especially violent and 
aggressive acts, are absolutely an important evaluation criterion within the insider threat 
framework to predict future misconduct or attacks. 
Additional stress, frustration, and despair are typically elevated due to the loss of 
friends or family members, divorce, financial stress, professional failures or misconduct, 
and victimization. Insider threat case studies and research have linked these types of 
significant life events as critical precursors that facilitated a mind-state or motivation to 
conduct a serious attack.83  The already vulnerable perpetrators due to their predisposition 
of disorders, traits, and CWBs were compounded by negative life-events that further thrust 
them into more emotional turmoil. Unfortunately, these significant life events, which are 
many times uncontrollable, produce a supporting catalysis that drives a vulnerable 
individual to commit an attack or misconduct. 
An individual’s physical health should be considered as an evaluation factor within 
the framework, as well. Although this category is not as critical of a metric as the other 
categories, physical health provides another area of concern. The violent and homicidal 
insider attacks case studies identified significant negative physical health issues in four of 
the ten researched perpetrators.84  Serious medical illnesses and physical disabilities 
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undoubtedly induce additional stressors and further incite negative significant life events 
for the individual.  
In general, the brief analysis concerning the insider threat framework encompasses 
a holistic approach to developing a Vulnerable Predisposition Profile, from the five 
separately assessed categories, while incorporating external factors and pathways to 
support assessing a possible internal threat. The concise synopsis of each element of the 
Composite Insider Threat Framework provided a fundamental summary of accepted 
research and conclusions vetted by insider threat experts, academic case studies, and 
PERSEREC reports. Overall, the underlying internal instability in conjunction with 
mounting personal and professional stressors ultimately increases an individual’s 
dangerous emotions to motivate and rationalization their actions.  
The behavioral science analyzed in this report demonstrates that there are valid 
characteristics and similarities exhibited by historical insider threat perpetrators regardless 
of the type of attack. Incorporating the established evidence of a vulnerable threat against 
the VPP categories of mental health, physical health, behavioral history, significant 
personal life events, and personality traits provides a model to develop a focused evaluation 
methodology (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Vulnerable Predisposition Profile Indicators 
C. DOD PERSONNEL MISCONDUCT ANALYSIS 
Unlike the insider threat framework, there isn’t a cohesive behavioral framework 
for individuals that commit the various forms of misconduct or criminal actions observed 
annually. As mentioned earlier, there are over 17,000 cases a year of misconduct for DOD 
federal civilian employees and 37,000 cases of non-judicial misconduct within the armed 
forces that range from insubordination, alcohol or substance abuse, workplace aggression, 
violence, misuse of government equipment and funding, and other behavioral 
infractions.85  The majority of military and federal civilian misconduct cases are single, 
isolated events that do not lead to additional serious second offenses or, more importantly, 
a catastrophic attack as discussed within the insider threat framework. However, a 
Government Accountability Office study identified that an annual average of 17,600 
military personnel, from 2011 to 2015, were discharged from the armed forces due to either 
a pattern of minor disciplinary infractions, recurring misconduct against good order and 
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discipline, or from the commission of a serious offense.86  One-fourth of the federal 
civilian employee misconduct cases involved individuals committing multiple offenses 
throughout their employment in the DOD.87  These are concerning factors as it indicates 
that there are many DOD personnel committing multiple offenses over years of service 
indicative of the progression along the Insider Attack Pathway. 
Of note, 62% of military personnel discharged from 2011–2015 for misconduct also 
suffered from one or more of the following mental health disorders consisting of anxiety, 
depression, PTSD, personality disorders, traumatic brain injuries, bipolar disorders, and 
substance dependency disorders.88  The highest percentage of cases involved disorders 
associated with depression, anxiety, and alcohol or substance dependency. Serving in the 
armed forces inherently involves significant organizational stressors that places additional 
personal burdens on military personnel. Similar to the Composite Insider Threat 
Framework, mental disorders appear to compound those personal and professional 
pressures leading to an individual to engage in misconduct or CWBs. Unfortunately, many 
military personnel currently suffer from mental health disorders while serving in the armed 
forces. A recent report determined that, on average, eight percent of active-duty service 
members are diagnosed with at least one of the mental health conditions related to 
personnel being separated for misconduct.89  The prevalence of these conditions coupled 
with the enormous stressors regarding military service suggests that misconduct will 
continue to occur at the current levels given the circumstances. 
Armed forces regulations do require service members to receive mental health and 
behavioral screening from clinical physicians when certain conditions are met or 
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commanders order evaluations to be completed.90  The documented military cases from 
the physicians provide the ability for the armed forces to generate statistical reports 
correlating mental health with misconduct. DOD federal civilians, however, are not subject 
to such evaluation requirements which does not facilitate the ability to easily analyze 
misconduct and mental health statistics together. It is estimated that 18.5 percent of 
Americans, 18 years or older, are diagnosed with one or more mental health disorders 
annually.91   Serious depressive illnesses, anxiety disorders, and schizophrenia comprise 
almost 30 percent of that population with reported mental health diagnoses.92  It is 
plausible to infer from these U.S. national mental health statistics that a portion of the DOD 
federal civilians committing general misconduct each year also have clinical mental health 
disorders similar to the occurrences within the armed forces. 
The large number of misconduct cases within the entirety of the DOD cannot 
simply be rationalized only by mental health disorders and incidental occurrences. Some 
misconduct involved in the DOD statistical reporting occur due to unintentional 
circumstances, an error in judgment, negligence, or issues merely related due to 
interpersonal conflict that does not escalate into additional misconduct. Regardless of 
whether the misconduct was deliberate or incidental, the behavioral science-based evidence 
depicted throughout the Composite Insider Threat Framework provides additional 
revelations that are directly attributable to understanding general misconduct and CWBs in 
cases without major attacks.  
As outlined in the previous section, CWB research identified that employees who 
typically deviate from acceptable organizational norms or engage in aggressive behaviors 
leading to misconduct generally exhibit personality traits consistent with low 
conscientiousness, low agreeableness, or high neuroticism. Actions exhibited by 
individuals that deviate from organizational norms center on poor work performance, 
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misuse resources and information, sabotage, and theft.93  Aggressive acts involve violent 
physical behavior, inappropriate verbal behavior, insubordination, and unsafe activities.94  
These types of CWBs undoubtedly fracture the workplace environment, delay overall 
productivity, and expend organizational resources to counteract the associated outcomes 
Additionally, deviant and aggressive CWBs tend to escalate from less egregious incidents 
towards more severe behaviors and ultimately misconduct.95  Personality traits should be 
considered an important factor in an individual’s susceptibility to committing misconduct, 
as well. 
D. ANALYSIS RELEVANCE AND CONCLUSIONS 
Although newly developed DOD User Activity Monitoring programs designed as 
a technological methodology to assess a potential insider-threat is growing, it is not a wide-
spread program and is reliant solely on organizational cyber activity.96  The majority of 
DOD Counter-Insider Threat programs rely on organizational processes and employees to 
identify all of the indicators surrounding a potential threat. Most employees are able to 
assess instances of aggression, workplace deviance, and threatening behaviors involved 
with most negative personality traits from fellow employees. Employees may also become 
aware of the personal facets of another employee’s personal stressors accompanied by 
significant life events to help establish additional indicators. Despite this, identifying 
mental illness, personality disorders, and enduring personality traits is outside the ordinary 
capabilities for most people. Mental health is an important categorical aspect for 
organizations to assess in order to completely evaluate a potential threat and intervene 
before an attack is conducted. Otherwise, what are the criteria thresholds for number of 
incidents, significant life events, and professional stressors indicators that must occur for 
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an employee or organization to take significant preventable action?  What are the 
appropriate actions to fully investigate or remove the threat based on the established 
thresholds?  These are the difficult questions surrounding the reliance on employee 
intuition and assessment when mental health diagnoses are not available. 
The current DOD counter-insider threat programs are valuable and necessary as the 
procedures provide the final barrier to identify, prevent, and respond against an impending 
threat. As with most wicked problems, multiple enduring policies and programs targeting 
varying issues are necessary to successfully mitigate the negative effects. Relying simply 
on supervisors and fellow employees to identify potential threats focuses efforts towards 
one aspect of the human capital management process. It is important to continue to reassess 
all programs to identify gaps or opportunities to enhance their effectiveness. Based on the 
DOD human capital acquisition processes outlined in the previous chapter, there are 
opportunities to incorporate approaches that reduce employing candidates assessed with 
extreme-risk profiles. 
The important scientific evidence derived from analytical research concerning 
historical insider attacks and misconduct provides a foundation to incorporate acquisition 
processes focused on identifying the specific negative characteristics within a candidate’s 
VPP. These categorized predispositions assign factors to develop models that can be 
screened and evaluated against to create an individualized metric-based level of risk for 
new candidates. As demonstrated through the extensive case studies and research, there are 
defined similarities between the insider attack perpetrators such as Hasan, Manning, and 
Snowden as well as the mass shooting perpetrators conducted by DOD personnel over the 
last decade. Establishing an acquisition process that incorporates a comprehensive 
assessment plan from these predisposition characteristics involving criteria related to 
mental health, personality traits, behavioral history, physical health, and experienced 
significant life events, will enable the DOD to hire personnel that exhibit reduced threat 
vulnerabilities and, therefore, are initially less susceptible to becoming future insider 
threats. Implementing screening measure to utilize self-report diagnostic assessments that 
are able to identify critical disorders and traits from simple questionnaires provides a 
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logical starting point to include in the proposed Enhanced Assessment Program detailed 
later in this report. 
Hasan, Manning, and Snowden displayed, or were attributed after the fact, multiple 
indicators of behavioral issues, CWBs, misconduct, and mental health disorders throughout 
their employment or military service. Administrative actions were conducted by their 
respective organizations; however, there were no significant interventions or 
comprehensive investigations to verify a threat existed. The combination of all of these 
factors are critical in the Insider Threat Pathway for an individual to commit misconduct 
or a pattern of misconduct that can lead to a catastrophic insider attack. Without reviewing 
all of the categorical factors, it is difficult to determine that an individual demonstrates a 
threat. Similarly, the recent mass shootings involving DOD personnel also demonstrated 
that the perpetrators shared predisposition criteria as with Hasan, Manning, and Snowden 
(see Table 1). Unfortunately, it is not apparent whether comprehensive screening of these 
malicious insider threats would have eliminated them from selection for employment or 
military service in the first place. This should not insinuate that an acquisition methodology 
to mitigate insider attacks is not viable and deserves further development. 
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Table 1. Insider Attack VPP Threat Indicators.97 
 
 
The theory behind utilizing the scientific evidence within the Composite Insider 
Threat Framework is to incorporate accepted screening methodologies into the DOD 
human capital acquisition process before a candidate is officially hired or serves in the 
military. Screening and evaluating candidates against insider threat characteristics, 
identified in the Vulnerable Predisposition Profile, focuses hiring efforts to initially select 
employees that are not dispositioned to multiple characteristics associated with insider 
attack perpetrators. The intent of establishing a process to develop an Enhanced 
Assessment Program focusing effort on screening for mental health disorders, personality 
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traits, behavioral history, significant life events, and physical health is to eliminate 
extremely high-risk candidates that embody the majority of the insider threat precursors 
throughout the acquisition process. 
The insider threat research has established the mental health and behavioral 
evidence of typical characteristics of an attack perpetrator. It is important to utilize that 
evidence to develop an innovative, scalable methodology that is not overbearing to enhance 
the DOD’s current human capital acquisition process in order mitigate insider threats and 
excessive misconduct. For example, under the current DOD acquisition systems an 
employment candidate may possess the prerequisite educational background, professional 
experience, security clearance, and abilities that meet the requirements for a given position 
or enlistment. Through the proposed additional Vulnerable Predisposition Profile 
screening, results identify that this KSA-viable candidate possesses five or six of the 
identified insider threat characteristics of a mental illness, personality disorders, aggressive 
and deviant personality traits, a negative behavioral history from criminal arrests as well 
as experiencing physical health issues and traumatic life events. Should the DOD risk 
hiring a federal civilian or new service member that was assessed to have the majority of 
traits that accompany insider attack perpetrators?  This is an extreme example as not all 
insider threats demonstrated a negative attribute in every category but the scenario cannot 
be discounted when compared to the pre-established evidence. Additionally, the DOD 
misconduct statistics suggest that this type of predisposed individual will tend to engage in 
CWBs or be susceptible to a pattern of misconduct. 
Overall, it will be important not to rely exclusively on a single screening or 
evaluation tool to assess the complete profile of a tentative candidate. In the next chapter, 
multiple tests, assessments, and evaluation tools will be examined. Each target specific 
aspects of mental health, personality, and predictive behavior to create a dataset of results 
for an initial profile assessment that is able to be incorporated into the DOD acquisition 
process. Instituting these types of self-report diagnostic assessments into the acquisition 
process will undoubtedly evoke controversial arguments due to current U.S. employment 
and privacy legislation. Regardless, this report will outline the scientific evidence as an 
innovative and supplementary approach to existing DOD Counter-Insider Threat Programs 
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in order to mitigate future insider attack and misconduct. Actual implementation of the 
proposed screening methodologies will undoubtedly require new congressional legislation 
and revised DOD policies. 
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IV. RELIABLE SELF-REPORT DIAGNOSTIC ASSESSMENT 
OPPORTUNITIES 
A. OVERVIEW AND PURPOSE 
The Vulnerable Predisposition Profile within the Composite Insider Threat 
Framework depicts the various negative individual characteristics associated with insider 
attack perpetrators and individuals that commit misconduct through the presented evidence 
in this report. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the viability of utilizing statistically 
reliable self-report assessment questionnaires that are intended to provide a tentative 
evaluation towards identifying mental health disorders, evaluate personality traits, and 
determine behavioral patterns. Similar to the approach implemented by the SFAS course, 
self-report questionnaires provide an initial diagnostic evaluation tool that is easily 
administered and provides near instantaneous results for use in further analysis. 
The reliability of self-report diagnostic assessments, in general, has been debated 
in the behavioral science fields due concerns involving type I errors of commission and 
type II errors of omission. In self-report assessments, type I errors of commission are 
referred to as false positives and occur when a respondent is incorrectly included in a 
specific categorization.98  Conversely, type II errors of omission occur when respondents 
are excluded from a specific categorization when, in fact, they should have been included 
in the categorization.99  Respondents may become classified into these two types of errors 
due to their inability to properly understand the assessment’s questions and, therefore, 
unwittingly misrepresent themselves.100  Another relative factor for consideration is that 
respondents are able to deliberately misrepresent or distort answers throughout the 
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screening assessments in order to conceal true results that are deemed negative.101  Despite 
this, reliable self-report questionnaires incorporate validity scales to measure the sincerity 
of the answers provided by the respondent. 
Self-report assessments are not without their limitations and results are not 
absolutely conclusive. It is important to note that these types of assessments are unable to 
definitively characterize or diagnose the respondent without further assessment to confirm 
or deny the findings. The results are not intended to be utilized as a method to clinically 
diagnose a respondent but rather provide initial baselines and underscore behavioral 
indicators for experts to substantiate through personal examination. Regardless, the 
reviewed self-report diagnostic assessments have been extensively studied and found to be 
statistically reliable evaluation tools for initial diagnostic screening purposes. 
The following diagnostic assessments demonstrate a current science-based 
capability to target specific predispositions or predictors concerning areas of mental health, 
personality traits, and behavioral tendencies. This report does not include internally 
conducted analysis or reliability testing for the discussed assessments. The intent is to 
prepare a general overview of existing assessments as examples of initial screening tools 
for future implementation within the DOD acquisition process. The diagnostic results 
derived from these various assessments are beneficial to hiring officials to understand 
predisposition indicators of disorders and negative traits exhibited by tentative candidates. 
It is recommended that these assessments be utilized as a preliminary screening tool to 
gather initial results during the acquisition process and not as a conclusive disqualification 
assessment. If elevated scores or indicators of mental and personality disorders are 
reported, in-person interviews conducted by mental health and behavioral health experts 
should be required to confirm the results in order to minimize discrimination through 
possible errors. 
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B. MILLON CLINICAL MULTIAXIAL INVENTORY OVERVIEW 
The Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-IV (MCMI) is the fourth version of the 
30-minute standardized diagnostic assessment consisting of 195 true-false self-report 
questions initially developed in 1977.102  The focus of the assessment is to provide a 
personalized report that assesses response patterns across a broad range of clinical mental 
health and personality disorders classified within the DSM as Axis I and Axis II disorders. 
A respondent’s results are reported within the MCMI-IV Interpretive Report that 
summarizes the data to identify tentative diagnoses, including their severity, based on 
scales assigned to 15 personality disorders and 10 mental health clinical syndromes (see 
Table 2).103  Scores are reported for each listed scale based on a range. Response scores 
that exceed an established threshold are interpreted as elevated indicators of a clinical 
diagnosis for that scale.104  The MCMI-IV also incorporates multiple validity scales to 
measure the authenticity of the responses as well as to detect random responding in order 
to minimize type I and type II misrepresentation errors.105 
 
102 “Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-IV,” Pearson Assessments, 2020, 
https://www.pearsonassessments.com/store/usassessments/en/Store/Professional-Assessments/Personality-
%26-Biopsychosocial/Millon-Clinical-Multiaxial-Inventory-IV/p/100001362.html?tab=product-details. 
103 Theodore Millon, Seth Grossman, and Carrie Millon, Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-IV 
Manual (Bloomington, MN: NCS Pearson Inc., 2015), 11. 
104 Millon, Grossman, and Millon, 7. 




Table 2. MCMI-IV Scales106 
 
 
The MCMI-IV has been extensively researched to determine the effectiveness to 
accurately indicate disorders through a simple self-report diagnostic assessment. Overall, 
the various updated versions of the MCMI have been considered a reliable assessment tool 
and popular for clinically psychologists to confirm suspected diagnoses.107  The analysis 
concerning the MCMI-IV self-report questionnaire supports the accurate screening of 
mental and personality disorders associated with malicious insider-attack perpetrators and 
severe misconduct. Specifically, the identification of the vulnerable predispositions of 
mental health disorders characterized by the DSM as Major Depression, Generalized 
 
106 Millon, Grossman, and Millon, Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-IV Manual. 
107 James P. Choca and Seth D. Grossman, “Evolution of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory,” 
Journal of Personality Assessment 97, no. 6 (November 2, 2015): 541–49; and Lisa M. Saulsman, 
“Depression, Anxiety, and the MCMI–III: Construct Validity and Diagnostic Efficiency,” Journal of 
Personality Assessment 93, no. 1 (January 2011): 76–83.. 
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Anxiety, PTSD, as well as Narcissism, Antisocial, Paranoid, Avoidant, and Schizoid 
personality disorders is absolutely important as those critical disorders are historically 
exhibited by catastrophic attack perpetrators. The MCMI-IV, or a similarly reliable 
assessment, provides a viable approach to implement as a pre-employment screening tool 
into the DOD acquisition process to mitigate selecting candidates with significant 
predispositions characterized in cases of serious misconduct or an insider-attacks. 
C. FIVE-FACTOR MODEL PERSONALITY TRAIT ASSESSMENTS 
Personality trait assessment testing in the United States initially started with the 
Woodworth Personal Date Sheet in 1917 to screen World War I combat soldiers and has 
continued to significantly evolve since that time.108  Currently, there are multiple reputable 
Five-Five Factor Model personality assessment questionnaires that are scientifically 
recognized in the behavioral science fields. One of the more well-known and utilized 
assessments, based directly on the Five-Factor Model, is the Neuroticism-Extraversion-
Openness Personality Inventory (NEO-PI). As described in Chapter III, the Five-Factor 
Model is concentrated on describing an individual’s personality traits across the five 
domains of Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness 
to Experience (see Table 3). Malicious insider-attack perpetrators and individuals that 
engage in CWBs as well as misconduct exhibit negative traits that Five-Factor Model 
assessments are capable of identifying. Specifically, individuals that engage in 
organizational deviance at work are linked to low scores in both conscientiousness and 
agreeableness within the Five-Factor Model. Aggressive CWBs and misconduct are 
attributed to individuals with high neuroticism or low conscientiousness. Other personality 
traits, that are on the high or low spectrums of the domains, are also important features in 
assessing an individual as they corollate to work performance and interpersonal 
relationships that influence CWBs and misconduct. Aggressive and deviant actions are the 
most concerning for organizations and require focused effort to combat. 
 
108 Robert E. Gibby and Michael J. Zickar, “A History of the Early Days of Personality Testing in 
American Industry: An Obsession with Adjustment.,” History of Psychology 11, no. 3 (August 2008): 164–
84. 
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Evidence-based research suggests that accepted self-report personality 
questionnaires, such as the various versions of the NEO-PI, are statistically reliable in 
assessing an individual’s personality traits as well as tentative personality disorders based 
on the five domains.110  The NEO-PI-3 is the newest version of the Five-Factor Model 
personality assessment that consists of 240 self-report questions with five scaled responses 
from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” requiring no more than 40 minutes to 
complete on average.111  The five domains include six detailed facet scales that assess 
specific behaviors to provide examiners with scores and indicators across each of the 30 
total scales (see Table 4).112  The NEO-PI-3 Interpretive Report not only includes the range 
 
109 Alicia Carrillo, Creation and Use of the NEO Personality Inventory-3TM and NEO Five- Factor 
Inventory-3TM (Lutz, FL: PAR, 2020), 3. 
110 James A. Carter et al., “Short-Term Stability of NEO–PI–R Personality Trait Scores in Opioid-
Dependent Outpatients.,” Psychology of Addictive Behaviors 15, no. 3 (2001): 255–60; Anupama Byravan 
and Nerella V Ramanaiah, “Structure of Personality Disorders from the Perspective of the Revised Neo 
Personality Inventory Domain Scales and the Psychopathology-5 Scales,” Psychological Reports, 1999, 4; 
and Paul T. Costa, “Work and Personality- Use of the NEO-PI-R in Industrial/Organizational Psychology,” 
Applied Psychology: An International Review 45, no. 3 (July 1996): 17. 
111 Carrillo, Creation and Use of the NEO Personality Inventory-3TM and NEO Five- Factor 
Inventory-3TM, 3. 
112 Carrillo, 3. 
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of scores but also include summarized personality description based on the five domains 
and behavioral descriptors for areas of concern for examiners to review.113 
Table 4. NEO-PI-3 Domains and Facets.114 
 
 
Although the primary purpose of the NEO-PI-3 is to assess a respondent’s 
personality across the five domains, the Interpretive Report describes behavioral 
tendencies, as well. Overall, personality screening is intended to provide individuals, 
employers, and clinical professionals with a simple testing method to utilize for acquisition 
processes or aid medical professionals in clinical diagnosis of mental and personality 
disorders. For this report, the purpose of incorporating a Five-Factor Model assessment, 
like the NEO-PI-3, is to screen candidates to identify extreme scores concerning the 
domains of Neuroticism, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness as those are the scale 
predictors for vulnerable predispositions regarding individuals committing misconduct and 
CWBs. 
 
113 NEO Personality Inventory-3 Interpretive Report (Lutz, FL: PAR, 2020). 
114 Carrillo, Creation and Use of the NEO Personality Inventory-3TM and NEO Five- Factor 
Inventory-3TM, 4. 
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D. MINNESOTA MULTIPHASIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY 
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is a self-report 
psychological assessment utilized for direct differential diagnosis to describe normal and 
abnormal personality characteristics, psychopathy symptoms, and behavioral tendencies 
originally developed in the 1940s.115  Since the 1980s, the various versions of the MMPI 
have gained significant notoriety, prevalent use in the clinical field of personality 
assessment due to the positive empirical reliability evidence, and are consistently updated 
to enhance scale inconsistencies over time.116  The MMPI-3 is the third updated version 
of the assessment released in 2020 consisting of 335 questions and averages 35 minutes to 
administer using computer-based software.117  It is a versatile assessment as it can be use 
in clinical settings to support medical and psychological diagnoses or utilized as a pre-
employment acquisition selection tool similar to the SFAS methodology.118  The 
assessment includes five scale-groups consisting of Validity, Higher-Order, Clinical, 
Specific Problems, and Personality Psychopathology totaling 52 individual scales (see 
Figure 6).119   
 
115 Martin Sellbom and Anthony M Tarescavage, MMPI-3 Technical Manual (Bloomington, MN: NCS 
Pearson Inc., 2020), 2–10. 
116 Irving B. Weiner and Edward W. Craighead, eds., The Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology, 4th ed., 
vol. 2 (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2010); Paul A. Arbisi, Martin Sellbom, and Yossef S. 
Ben-Porath, “Empirical Correlates of the MMPI–2 Restructured Clinical (RC) Scales in Psychiatric 
Inpatients,” Journal of Personality Assessment 90, no. 2 (February 25, 2008): 122–23; and Leonard J. 
Simms et al., “Psychometric Evaluation of the Restructured Clinical Scales of the MMPI-2.,” 
Psychological Assessment 17, no. 3 (September 2005): 357. 
117 MMPI-3 Brochure (Bloomington, MN: NCS Pearson Inc., 2020), 2. 
118 Yossef S Ben-Porath and Auke Tellegen, MMPI-3 Manual for Administration, Scoring, and 
Interpretation (Bloomington, MN: NCS Pearson Inc., 2020), 1–7. 
119 Ben-Porath and Tellegen, 8–10. 
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Figure 6. MMPI-3 Scales.120 
The MMPI-3 Interpretive Report results provide individual score ranges for each 
scale as well as descriptive diagnostic summaries concerning elevated clinical symptom 
results. Although the MMPI-3 scales are not in direct alignment with the DSM similar to 
the MCMI-IV, the MMPI-3 scales are personality driven descriptors to determine 
behavioral tendencies and clinical profiles based on a respondent’s answers.121  For this 
reason, the MMPI-3 provides insight or predictors into the negative situational reactions 
and internalized scales that correlate to behaviors for individuals that engage in CWBs or 
commit misconduct. Unlike the MCMI-IV and the NEO-PI-3 assessments, scales within 
 
120 MMPI-3 Brochure, 3. 
121 Ben-Porath and Tellegen, MMPI-3 Manual for Administration, Scoring, and Interpretation, 2–10; 
and Weiner and Craighead, The Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology. 
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the MMPI-3 provide additional analysis concerning abnormal medical health responses, 
family problems, and drug and alcohol abuse. Another critical component is the robust 
grouping of 11 embedded validity scales intended to identify inaccurate results by 
providing examiners with indicators of deliberate deception and inconsistent responses to 
minimize type I and type II errors.122 
There is no doubt that the MMPI-3 is capable of being utilized as a primary, stand-
alone assessment tool, as indicated through the substantial number of studies documenting 
the reliability as well as the prioritized use throughout the U.S. Army SFAS course. The 
assessment screens for a multitude of clinical disorders, personality traits, and behavioral 
tendencies important to assessing a candidate for vulnerable predispositions. The 
recommended approach is to administer the MMPI-3 as a complementary assessment in 
conjunction with the MCMI-IV and the NEO-PI-3. The MMPI-3 screens for clinical 
disorders as well as prepares results across the five personality domains. Using the MMPI-
3 as a complementary assessment enhances response validity through administering a 
battery of tests instead of relying on one assessment to screen for negative 
characterizations. The theory is that utilizing a battery of tests will reduce the respondent’s 
ability to deliberately deceive results over multiple tests and questions. Additionally, a 
battery of assessments will corroborate significant findings to enhance the screening 
reliability of the other two tests and vice versa. 
E. SELF-REPORT DIAGNOSTIC ASSESSMENT CONCLUSIONS 
Scientific evidence connecting critical mental health and personality disorders with 
historical malicious insider attacks and severe misconduct must not be ignored in the 
pursuit of mitigating future threats. Recent government and DOD orders have directed 
efforts to institute new human capital acquisitions processes that reduce such threats. 
Screening new candidates through the described self-report assessments is a critical initial 
step in the selection process as it is currently the only methodology that identifies 
behavioral factors corresponding with historical attacks and misconduct. The self-report 
 
122 Sellbom and Tarescavage, MMPI-3 Technical Manual, 9–13; and Baweja et al., An Evaluation of 
the Utility of Expanding Psychological Screening to Prevent Insider Attacks, 23–24. 
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diagnostic assessments are relatively easy to administer through computer-based software 
and require less than 40 minutes each to complete. These assessments must be prioritized 
as a preliminary diagnostic to determine any inclination of concerning disorders or traits 
within the Enhanced Assessment Program.  
It is possible that administering one diagnostic assessment, such as the MMPI-3, is 
sufficient enough to gather proper results to analyze an individual based on the described 
evidence. It would also be the most cost effective approach while minimizing additional 
examination timelines and resources that are incurred through multiple diagnostic 
assessment. There is a higher probability that more type I and type II errors will occur with 
results from only one diagnostic. Experts convey concerns that individuals can simply 
defeat self-report diagnostics through prior research or coaching by deliberately 
misrepresenting actual responses to questions in order to bypass negative results.123  
Assessments with embedded validity scales are necessary to determine the reliability of the 
results. Administering a battery of diagnostic assessments decreases the probability for a 
respondent to deceive the results to conceal tentative disorders or for a respondent to 
unintentionally misrepresent themselves. 
Administering multiple diagnostic assessments will undoubtedly require additional 
resources, funding, and are more time-consuming. The benefit of using the MCMI-IV and 
the NEO-PI-3 as principle assessments is that they screen for the particular mental health 
and personality disorders that align with the associated indicators from historical insider 
attack perpetrators and individuals that commit misconduct. Individual scores concerning 
scales identifying clinical anxiety, depression, PTSD, as well as the various personality 
disorders and traits provide officials with specified results in those prioritized categories. 
Incorporating the MMPI-3 as a complimentary assessment facilitates secondary validity 
screening to minimize type I and type II errors. Utilizing a battery of assessments also 
enhances the reliability of the result for examiners to evaluate through secondary source 
confirmation. 
 
123 Baweja et al., 23–24. 
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V. RECOMMENDED DOD HUMAN CAPITAL ACQUISITION 
PROCESS ENHANCEMENTS 
A. THE ENHANCED ASSESSMENT PROGRAM INTENT 
The vast majority of DOD Counter-Insider Threat Programs are designed to 
identify, deter, and prevent current employees from committing malicious attacks. The 
Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency established an internal department 
specifically to manage Counter-Insider Threat Programs through research and 
implementation of wide-spread training mandates for DOD personnel. Government 
Counter-Insider Threat Program funding has steadily increased over the last few years and 
is estimated to exceed $69 million according to the 2020 Presidential Budget for Defense 
Security Services as it is critical to national security.124  Unfortunately, the current 
programs do not place significant focus on acquisition procedures to screen candidates and 
recruits based on the associated VPP indicators referenced in Chapter III. Rather the 
primary intent is to reduce existing personnel from committing insider attacks. The critical 
component for current DOD Counter-Insider Threat Programs is for fellow employees to 
identify a tentative threat and inform security officials. It is a difficult proposition for 
anyone to determine, without mental health assessments, that another employee is at a 
breaking point to commit a malicious attack. 
Instituting self-report diagnostic assessment screening throughout the human 
capital acquisition process is absolutely a necessary first step towards mitigating insider 
attacks and misconduct within the Enhanced Assessment Program. The Enhanced 
Assessment Program is intended to replicate the SFAS “whole-person” assessment 
methodology to screen an individual against the critical VPP categories in addition to 
selecting personnel based on KSAs, experience, and interview performance. Both the DOD 
federal civilian and armed forces acquisition processes have gaps that do not screen for 
certain critical VPP indicators considered to elevate the risk of misconduct and malicious 
insider attacks in predisposed individuals. 
 
124 Fiscal Year 2020 President’s Budget: Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide Defense Security 
Service (Washington, DC: Defense Security Service, 2019), 9. 
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Overall, the recommended program is designed to be scalable to facilitate 
implementation requirements without overly disrupting the process and minimizing the 
accompanying costs. In order to adapt the DOD acquisitions processes, while maintaining 
a manageable system, the Enhanced Assessment Program initially focuses preliminary 
screening of the critical VPP characteristics concerning mental health disorders and 
personality traits. The majority of the insider attack perpetrators and personnel engaging in 
serious misconduct exhibited or were diagnosed with significant mental health conditions 
and aggressive CWBs prior to their acts. The critical procedure within the Enhanced 
Assessment Program is to administer self-report diagnostic assessments to initially identify 
the existence of those VPP disorders and traits. Overall, the goal is to minimize the number 
of candidates and recruits requiring additional screening measures and, by proxy, reducing 
the need for excessive resources to interview every individual applicant. 
The recommended approach for the Enhanced Assessment Program is to use 
multiple self-report diagnostic assessments such as the MCMI-IV, NEO-PI-3, and the 
MMPI-3 to initially assess tentative candidates and recruits. Multiple assessments provide 
an improved level of validity as well as reliability to minimize type I and type II errors. 
The goal is to increase the confidence of the screening methodology to conduct resource 
intensive personal interviews only with individuals whose assessment results indicated 
concerning diagnoses or traits. The self-report diagnostics assessments are the critical 
components of the improved acquisition system to target the crucial VPP characteristics 
involved in malicious insider attacks and serious misconduct. Diagnostic assessment 
results that report indications of mental health disorders and concerning personality trait 
scores associated with the VPP model will then require an Expert Evaluation Interview 
with a government appointed behavioral expert. Otherwise, candidates and recruits 
continue through the standard process without completing an interview when results do not 
indicate tentative VPP disorders or traits. Prior to the Expert Evaluation Interview, the 
individuals criminal report and medical records must be reviewed to support probing 
questions concerning behavioral history and prior medical treatment. This procedure 
provides enhancing details for the interview to build an initial profile and maximize 
individualized information prior to the interview (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Self-Report Diagnostic Assessment Procedures 
The main intent of the Expert Evaluation Interview is to confirm or deny the initial 
results of the diagnostic assessments. Although multiple interviews with a candidate or 
recruit provides a more refined evaluation, a single interview is deemed sufficient to 
determine the existence of significant conditions in conjunction with the diagnostic 
assessments.125  A secondary purpose is to develop a profile that evaluates a level of risk 
associated with that individual based on their reported criminal record, medical history, 
and significant life events identified through federal databases. The interview process must 
include additional questioning and investigation along these categories to gather 
information for a recommended determination. It is necessary for evaluators to utilize a 
pre-established VPP Risk Matrix that templates a point value for all VPP indicators to 
determine the associated risk-level for each individual that is interviewed (see Table 5). 
Each mental health disorder receives two points while the other VPP characteristic receives 
a single point. The points from all categories are totaled to summarize the level of risk 
associated for a specific candidate or recruit. 
 
125 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 686. 
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Disqualifying a candidate or recruit for a serious mental health disorder is more 
straightforward when confirmed through an in-person interview. Armed forces regulations 
assign disqualifying conditions for maladaptive personality disorders and severe mental 
illness regarding major depression, clinical anxiety, and psychosis.126  There are no 
existing regulations that authorize the DOD to disqualify a candidate or recruit for 
personality traits. Despite this, the VPP personality indicators for extremely low scores in 
agreeableness and conscientiousness as well as high scores in neuroticism must also initiate 
an Expert Evaluation Interview to determine a risk assessment for the individual. 
Making an informed decision to disqualify an individual based on negative 
personality trait indicators rather than mental health disorders is more problematic as there 
isn’t a medical diagnosis involved. In general, the DOD needs aggressive personnel for the 
armed forces and certain federal civilian positions. However, their aggression must be 
controllable and manageable. Analyzing criminal behavior in conjunction with cases of 
concerning aggressive personality trait results will provide supporting factors when 
assessing the viability of a candidate with concerning personality traits. An individual with 
aggressive personality traits and arrests for violent criminal behavior demonstrates that 
there is a greater probability they are incapable of managing their aggression in certain 
situations. The Expert Evaluation Interview will be crucial in investigating all supporting 
characteristics of the VPP model to develop a complete profile to determine the level of 
risk for selecting the specific candidate or recruit. The Enhanced Assessment Program 
 
126 Medical Standards for Appointment, Enlistment, or Induction into the Military Services, 44–46. 
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provides a sufficient methodology that is not overly demanding for hiring officials or 
MEPS personnel in the effort to select personnel that do not exhibit VPP indicators. 
B. ARMED FORCES ENHANCED ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 
ACQUISITION PROCESS 
The armed forces acquisition process is already a robust system with extensive 
facilities, personnel, and resources to screen recruits for military service. Due to the 
established MEPS process, minimal adjustments would be required to incorporate the 
Enhanced Assessment Program for the armed forces’ overall process. The principle factor 
is incorporating self-report diagnostic assessment procedures as a preliminary screening 
tool to determine the necessity for further evaluation of a recruit that requires in-person 
interviews with behavioral health experts to confirm the presence of mental health 
predispositions. 
Mental health screening at MEPS is currently limited to a simple questionnaire and 
interview for the recruit to report the existence of mental health or personality disorders. 
Evidence from Chapter II demonstrated that the majority of recruits do not report such 
disorders as they are disqualifying conditions. Additionally, 40 percent of all military 
personnel are below the age of 25 years old.127  There is a high probability that many 
recruits have never been assessed by a mental health expert prior to their enlistment and 
are unaware of any official diagnosis concerning the existence of mental health disorders. 
Without actual mental health diagnostic screening procedures throughout MEPS, the 
armed forces’ process is failing to identify individuals with serious disqualifying disorders 
that tend to lead to patterns of misconduct, poor performance, and malicious attacks 
according to the pre-established evidence. 
The Enhanced Assessment Program methodology provides the armed forces with 
a manageable approach to incorporate diagnostic assessments to screen the mental health 
and personality of tentative recruits. As with the current process, the recruit must satisfy 
all minimum eligibility requirements and complete the entrance application documentation 
 
127 “Mental Illness Statistics,” National Institute of Mental Health, 2020, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/
health/statistics/mental-illness.shtml. 
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before taking the computer-based ASVAB. The recommendation is to administer all 
computer-based self-report diagnostic assessments in conjunction with the ASVAB test to 
utilize the same MEPS facilities, personnel, and computers. This reduces imposing 
significant additional constraints to the current acquisition system. Self-report assessment 
scores that are consistent with the associated vulnerable mental health and personality 
indicators then initiates a mandatory Expert Evaluation Interview with a behavioral health 
specialist when the recruit is scheduled for the medical examination screening at the MEPS 
facility (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. The Armed Forces Enhanced Assessment Program Methodology 
The recommended adaptations to the armed forces’ acquisition process is 
minimally disrupted by implementing the additional self-report diagnostic assessments. All 
recruits are required to take an additional 90-minutes of testing immediately after 
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completing the ASVAB at the MEPS testing site. Only those individuals that exceed the 
scores associated with the diagnostic assessment thresholds would require an Expert 
Evaluation Interview prior to the medical screening process of MEPS. Although the 
Enhanced Assessment Program screening does not completely revamp the current system, 
there will be significant costs to implement the new procedures. Additional funding will 
undoubtedly be required to develop a contract for the diagnostic assessment software and 
administration tools as well as expanding the number of behavioral health experts at each 
MEPS location to conduct the Expert Evaluation Interview for tentative recruits. Detailed 
research is needed to identify the specific funding requirements, personnel, and resources 
to implement the Enhanced Assessment Program procedures.  
C. DOD FEDERAL CIVILIAN ENHANCED ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 
ACQUISITION PROCESS 
Adapting the DOD federal civilian acquisition process is more complex and 
demanding than with the armed forces’ MEPS screening concerning the Enhanced 
Assessment Program methodology. The federal civilian acquisition process is inherently 
decentralized which can be completed entirely through virtual application and interview 
procedures. Additionally, aside from the DOD Personnel Reliability Program, there are no 
disqualification policies for mental health disorders regarding federal civilian employment 
as the DOD adheres to the American Disabilities Act. There are two procedural options for 
the DOD to implement the Enhanced Assessment Program into the DOD federal civilian 
acquisition process. First, the DOD would need to implement new policies that 
automatically disqualifies candidates for mental health disorders similar to the armed 
forces policies. Another approach is for experts to compile an assessment based on the VPP 
Risk Matrix from information gathered during the Expert Evaluation Interview for DOD 
hiring officials to incorporate into their overall selection methodology.  
At a minimum, any candidate assessed as an “extremely high-risk” in accordance 
with the VPP risk matrix must be automatically eliminated from contention. The hiring 
official is then authorized to continue the selection process with the remaining candidates 
by reviewing their KSAs, VPP risk-level, and interview performance. “High-risk” 
candidates, if selected, should require justification from the hiring official and a secondary 
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review from a designated approving authority. It is important to note that either procedural 
approaches more than likely require congressional legislation to authorize screening 
federal civilian candidates for mental health conditions and their personal background as 
intended through the Enhanced Assessment Program process. 
Due to the decentralized structure of the acquisition process, efficient procedures 
are required that will not restrict the process as the DOD employs over 750,000 total 
civilian personnel.128  The current DOD federal civilian acquisition process prioritizes 
evaluating candidates by assessing their KSAs and experience. In order to incorporate the 
Enhanced Assessment Program methodology, the goal is to initially establish an adapted 
model that includes diagnostic assessments to screen only the “highest qualified” 
candidates before hiring officials conduct an interview. This approach minimizes the need 
to conduct Expert Evaluation Interviews with candidates that are considered “minimally 
qualified.” 
The Enhanced Assessment Program screening process requires a slight 
modification to incorporate the additional diagnostic assessments and Expert Evaluation 
Interviews. The following process is a concise summary of the order of events required to 
incorporate the additional screening methods (see Figure 9). It is recommended that the 
DOD still maintains selecting candidates based on KSA and experience first. Only the 
“highest qualified” candidates are then instructed to complete web-based versions of the 
three self-report diagnostic assessment from a personal computer. Any candidate that 
exceeds the threshold scores for mental health and personality trait VPP indicators must 
then complete the Expert Evaluation Interview, either in-person or utilizing video 
conferencing capabilities. There is no doubt that conducting a mental health evaluation 
over video conferencing is not ideal for behavioral health experts to best assess a candidate 
compared with in-person evaluations. Video conferencing is a flexible alternative that a 
centralized governmental department is able to employ as a secondary option when in-
person evaluations are impractical. After all candidates meet the required assessment 
 
128 Jared Serbu, “DOD Plans Civilian Workforce Increase, Especially Health Fields,” Federal News 
Network, March 13, 2019, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/defense-news/2019/03/dod-plans-civilian-
workforce-increase-especially-health-fields/. 
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criteria, the hiring official then conducts the job interviews. The selected candidate is 
offered the position and a security clearance investigation is initiated, if required. 
 
Figure 9. DOD Federal Civilian Enhanced Assessment Program 
Methodology 
Similar to the budget considerations for the armed forces, the DOD federal civilian 
acquisition process will require additional funding to develop the required infrastructure 
for the intended Enhanced Assessment Program methodology. Contract funding is 
necessary to administer the self-report diagnostic assessments as well as develop a 
department to manage the Expert Evaluation Interviews. It is possible that the DOD federal 
civilian process could utilize behavioral health experts from MEPS to conduct in-person 
Expert Evaluation Interviews for candidates within an appropriate driving radius of a 
MEPS facility. Otherwise, a video conference interview would be the next best alternative. 
Other options for the DOD are to either develop an internal capability or request support 
from an external governmental organization such as the Department of Health and Human 
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Services’ Program Support Center Psychological Testing and Evaluation Program to 
conduct all video conference Expert Evaluation Interviews. Overall, further research 
concerning budgetary and functional considerations is required to detail the 
implementation requirements for the incorporation of the Enhanced Assessment Program 
methodology into the DOD federal civilian acquisition process. 
D. ENDURING ASSESSMENT PRACTICES 
Although this report focuses initial effort to establish procedures throughout the 
acquisition process, the general Enhanced Assessment Program methodology should 
become an enduring practice to manage personnel after they are selected. Establishing a 
long-standing program to re-assess current personnel in certain situations should be 
incorporated into DOD Counter-Insider Threat Programs. Mental health and personality 
disorders develop or increase in severity throughout an individual’s life.129  Re-
assessments may identify a mental health or personality disorder years after the individual 
was initially selected through the acquisition process. Therefore, recurring assessments 
every five years should be mandated for individual with security clearances. Another 
recommendation is for re-assessments to be completed for federal civilians conducting an 
internal department hiring process for a new DOD position. Additionally, all current armed 
forces enlisted personnel applying to become a Warrant Officer or Commissioned Officer 
need to be re-assessed throughout the transition process. 
At a minimum, policies must be enacted to initiate a misconduct review board and 
mandate re-assessment screening procedures for the offending personnel in cases of 
significant misconduct requiring administrative action. The mental health re-assessment 
will facilitate decisions by leadership in the review board to determining if additional 
investigation or monitoring is required when an individual isn’t terminated from their 
position or discharged from military service. Overall, the updated mental health screening 
supports leadership to make appropriate decisions to determine if an individual is 
progressing through the Insider Attack Pathway through the mandated misconduct review. 
 
129 “Mental Illness Statistics”; and Baweja et al., An Evaluation of the Utility of Expanding 
Psychological Screening to Prevent Insider Attacks, 22–24. 
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VI. IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
The primary intent of this report is to outline the evidence compiled from scientific 
research demonstrating the connection between individuals that commit malicious insider 
attacks and serious misconduct to the Vulnerable Predisposition Profile indicators 
categories. The most critical predisposition indicators center on mental health disorders 
and negative personality traits. Therefore, the Enhanced Assessment Program focuses 
effort to first identify the existence of such indicators through reliable self-report diagnostic 
assessments as an initial starting point. This approach is intended to minimize committing 
extensive resources to conduct personal interviews to evaluate every candidate or recruit 
for indications of mental health disorders. Mandating in-person evaluations for every 
candidate or recruit is not a feasible practice as it is extremely time consuming and would 
significantly increase budgetary cost to complete appropriately within the DOD.130  The 
only feasible approach to meet the established White House Executive Orders and DOD 
Policy Instructions to mitigate insider attacks and misconduct is to expand acquisition 
screening to incorporate self-report diagnostic assessments as a preliminary tool to 
determine which individuals require addition evaluation before being selected. 
There are limitations to this report as it only suggests two defined acquisition 
processes to reduce the threats of malicious insider attacks and misconduct without 
significantly addressing tentative implementation concerns. There is validity in utilizing 
the Enhanced Assessment Program methodology based on the demonstrated evidence. 
Despite this, arguments and objections that screening DOD federal civilian candidates for 
mental health and personality disorders is a discriminatory practice against individuals with 
such diagnoses does have merit. Serving in the Armed Forces or working for the DOD is 
not an inalienable right but rather a privilege. Government officials must prioritize the 
national security of the United States over individual sentiment. Congressional legislation 
would undoubtedly be required for department-wide implementation of mental health 
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screening for DOD federal civilians acquisition processes similar to the exemptions already 
established for the armed forces’ MEPS screening. There is already governmental 
precedent for such procedures as highlighted by the use of mental health screening in the 
Department of Energy Human Reliability Program, the Department of Defense Personnel 
Reliability Program, the Army SFAS course, and for specific positions within the Central 
Intelligence Agency. Exceptions to authorize the DOD to include mental health screening 
must be considered when national security is involved. 
Another concern is that enacting additional screening measures will possibly inhibit 
the armed forces from meeting annual personnel end-strength goals for new recruits due to 
the identification of disqualifying conditions not previously targeted. The DOD federal 
civilian workforce could face similar issues of not filling critical positions due to new 
disqualifying screening procedures. Serving in the armed forces is a demanding occupation 
that naturally incites instances of anxiety, depression, and stress simply due to the extreme 
organizational requirements. The military is not an organization that facilitates an 
acceptable environment for individuals that are already predisposed to such clinical 
disorders which is reason MEPS regulations exist for these disqualifying conditions. 
Reduced personnel end-strength is a legitimate concern; however, the Enhanced 
Assessment Program methodology must not be immediately discounted simply from this 
objection. Especially when severe mental illness disorders, personality disorders, and 
negative personality traits are link to misconduct and malicious insider attacks. 
Establishing the Enhanced Assessment Program is a complex project even though 
this report considers the program to be the most efficient approach to screening applicants 
for VPPs. The next recommended research initiative is for the DOD to establish a 
commission, comprised of experts across the required disciplines, to conduct research 
detailing the budgetary, personnel, and self-report diagnostic assessment implications to 
enact the Enhanced Assessment Program acquisition processes. Initial analysis was 
conducted to estimate the costs, requirements, and effects of implementing such a program; 
however, this proved to be outside the capability of this report. Those unknown variables 
and statistics inhibited formalizing a complete analysis. It is essential to develop research 
studies and pilot programs to determine the annual percentage of federal civilian candidates 
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and military recruits requiring an Expert Evaluation Interview. This information is critical 
in estimating the additional behavioral health personnel required for each MEPs location 
and supporting government departments. The same commission and studies would provide 
context as to the estimated annual percentage of disqualified candidates and recruits as well 
as recommend necessary legislation for the implementation. 
The scientific-based evidence supports the rationale to incorporate the Enhanced 
Assessment Program methodologies to mitigate insider-threats and reduce misconduct by 
identifying VPP indicators. Multiple Counter-Insider Threat Programs and measures to 
reduce misconduct already exist throughout the Department of Defense. Unfortunately, the 
negative activities still occur at similar annual rates. It is time to focus effort within the 
acquisition phase of the human capital management process to target the issue from a 
different perspective instead of relying on existing programs to make the critical difference. 
Insider Threats and misconduct are complex problems that require multiple polices to 
target the various underlying circumstances involved. The current Counter-Insider Threat 
Programs are absolutely necessary and should still be utilized in conjunction with the 
Enhanced Assessment Program. There is legitimate credibility based on the evidence 
outlined throughout this report to institute enhanced measures to assess the entirety of an 
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